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An Oil Shock Tunisia Cannot Absorb Without Structural Reforms

Ghazi Ben Ahmed — Mon, 30 Mar 2026 17:07:19 +0000

Brent crude settled at $79.45 on March 1 — before the strike on the Ras Tanura refinery operated by Saudi Aramco, before major shipping lines suspended transit through the Strait of Hormuz, and before mounting security alerts signaled that this narrow waterway – conduit for nearly one-fifth of global oil flows – had become a strategic flashpoint.

The price visible on trading screens reflects transactions already executed; it does not fully incorporate routes disrupted, insurance premiums recalculated, and supply chains placed under geopolitical constraint. Markets continue to treat oil primarily as a commodity. Yet in the Strait of Hormuz, it is increasingly subject to geopolitical leverage.

For Tunisia, this shift is not theoretical. It has direct macroeconomic consequences.

A Budget Assumption Under Strain

Tunisia’s 2026 Finance Law is built on an assumed average oil price of $63.3 per barrel. Current levels stand well above that reference. The deviation is economically significant.

Each additional dollar in the price of oil adds approximately 164 million dinars to compensation expenditures. This mechanism is automatic: higher import costs expand subsidy requirements, widening the fiscal deficit unless offset by higher revenues or expenditure restraint.

At $80 per barrel, fiscal pressure intensifies. At $90, adjustment becomes considerably more difficult. At $100, the budgetary impact is substantial and sustained.

Tunisia enters this phase with elevated public debt, rigid expenditure structures dominated by wages, subsidies, and debt servicing, and limited access to international capital markets. In such a configuration, the scope for discretionary counter-cyclical policy is structurally constrained.

Inflation Through Production and Imports

The oil shock extends beyond public finances. Energy is a core input in transport, electricity generation, agriculture, and manufacturing. Petroleum derivatives are embedded in plastics, packaging, fertilizers, and numerous industrial processes. Tunisia also imports finished goods from economies where energy prices are not subsidized, meaning higher oil prices are transmitted directly through import costs.

The consequence is imported inflation.

According to Capital Economics, a prolonged conflict pushing oil to $100 per barrel could add between 0.6 and 0.7 percentage points to global inflation. For Tunisia, such an increase would translate into higher consumer prices, further compressing purchasing power at a time when households are already adjusting to elevated living costs.

Inflation in this context is not merely a statistical outcome; it has distributive effects, disproportionately affecting lower- and middle-income households whose consumption baskets are more sensitive to energy and transport costs.

External Balances and Logistical Pressures

As a net importer of hydrocarbons, Tunisia’s trade balance is structurally sensitive to oil prices. A sustained rise in the energy bill deepens the current account deficit and places additional strain on foreign-exchange reserves; a key buffer for exchange-rate stability and external confidence.

Logistics compound this vulnerability. Maritime insurance premiums have increased amid instability affecting transit routes, particularly through the Suez Canal. Rerouting and security surcharges raise freight costs, affecting both consumer goods and intermediate inputs used in domestic production.

Meanwhile, JPMorgan Chase has noted that dozens of empty oil tankers are currently waiting near the Gulf region. Storage capacity in producing countries is limited to only a few days of output. Should disruptions persist, logistical bottlenecks could evolve into production constraints, reinforcing upward pressure on prices and prolonging market tightness.

Under such conditions, what begins as volatility risks becoming structural imbalance.

A Dual Shock in a Constrained Policy Environment

The present oil surge constitutes a dual shock for Tunisia:

Fiscal, through rising compensation costs and widening deficits;
Economic, through imported inflation, higher production expenses, and increased transport costs.

These channels interact. Larger subsidies expand borrowing needs; higher import bills weaken external balances; inflation erodes real incomes; slower growth limits revenue mobilization. The cumulative effect narrows policy options further.

Tunisia’s vulnerability is structural. The economy remains heavily dependent on imported hydrocarbons to sustain transport, electricity generation, and industry. Export diversification remains limited, and foreign-currency earnings are insufficient to offset large energy import bills. Fiscal rigidities reduce flexibility precisely when flexibility is most needed.

Without structural reform – including accelerated investment in renewable energy, improved energy efficiency, enhanced export competitiveness, and a credible medium-term fiscal consolidation strategy – exposure to external energy shocks will persist.

Regional Context, Asymmetric Exposure

Tunisia is not alone in its sensitivity to oil prices. Morocco, also a net oil importer, faces similar exposure to prolonged price increases and imported inflation.

By contrast, Algeria, as a hydrocarbon exporter, benefits from higher prices in the short term. Yet its fiscal and external balances remain closely tied to energy revenues, and regional instability carries its own financial and security risks. Energy shocks reshape North African macroeconomic dynamics, albeit asymmetrically.

A Narrow Margin for Absorption

The Strait of Hormuz lies far from Tunis geographically, but its stability influences Tunisia’s fiscal trajectory, inflation path, reserve adequacy, and growth outlook. In an interconnected energy system, distance offers no insulation.

If oil prices stabilize quickly, Tunisia will face a demanding but manageable adjustment. If elevated prices persist, the convergence of fiscal expansion, external deterioration, and inflationary pressure could significantly constrain macroeconomic stability.

In this context, the gravest risk is not simply fiscal slippage or higher inflation, but a broader breakdown of economic stability; one that could weaken the dinar, exhaust foreign-exchange reserves, and trigger acute shortages. Such a configuration would not remain confined to macroeconomic indicators; it would carry profound social and political consequences in a country where economic strain has historically translated into systemic upheaval.

A further vulnerability lies in Tunisia’s increasingly constrained diplomatic positioning. External financial support cannot be assumed. In previous crises, Gulf countries provided liquidity backstops or budgetary assistance. Today, geopolitical alignments are more fragmented, and Tunisia’s ambiguous positioning in regional tensions may reduce the likelihood of rapid financial relief from traditional partners.

Should regional polarization intensify, economic repercussions could extend beyond capital flows. Labor mobility, remittance channels, and bilateral economic ties may become exposed to political recalibration. For countries such as Tunisia and Algeria, whose citizens maintain economic linkages across the Gulf, the risk is not only financial but also socio-economic.

In such a scenario and to conclude, the convergence of constrained external financing, accelerating dinar depreciation, reserve exhaustion, entrenched inflation, and disrupted remittance inflows would not merely intensify macroeconomic stress; it could transform what is currently treated as speculative risk into the premature unraveling of an already fragile economic system. An economy structurally dependent on external financing, weak in productive diversification, and unable to generate sustained growth or macroeconomic stability cannot indefinitely absorb cumulative shocks.

Under prolonged pressure, the outcome would not be a cyclical adjustment, but the materialization of a risk long feared yet seldom articulated: that sustained economic breakdown could once again trigger systemic political rupture. If left unaddressed, the consequences may extend beyond institutional instability to social fragmentation and lasting damage to the state itself. The question is no longer whether reform is necessary, but whether there is still time to act.

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Clitomachus of Carthage, the Tunisian philosopher our Republic needs!

Ghazi Ben Ahmed — Thu, 04 Dec 2025 19:52:59 +0000

Since independence, Tunisia has continuously sought to define the contours of an identity that is truly its own—both freed from the weight of colonial domination and liberated from reductive interpretations. The notion of “Tunisianity” belongs to this quest: not a single Arab-Muslim identity, but the heritage of a long historical layering in which Berbers, Punics, Romans, Christians, Arabs and other Mediterranean peoples have, successively or simultaneously, shaped this land.

Habib Bourguiba himself embodied this ambivalence. In the early years of independence, he favoured a unifying discourse centred on Arab-Muslim belonging, even distancing the Amazigh dimension, which he perceived as a potential threat to national unity. Yet, at the same time, he was profoundly aware of the richness of Tunisia’s ancient past and did not hesitate to symbolically place himself in the lineage of figures such as Hannibal or Saint Augustine. It is from this plural historical foundation that he paradoxically helped forge the basis of a modern Tunisianity: rooted in its historical depth, yet open to the Mediterranean and the wider world.

It is within this intellectual continuity that it becomes both relevant and necessary today to consider the integration of Clitomachus of Carthage into the Tunisian pantheon.

Clitomachus of Carthage: a Carthaginian at the heart of ancient philosophy

Clitomachus of Carthage, whose Carthaginian name was Hasdrubal, is one of the most fascinating yet most overlooked figures of ancient philosophy. Born in Carthage around 187 BC, he left his native city for Athens after the destruction of Carthage, where he became a disciple of Carneades and, later, the head of the New Academy.

His work forms part of the tradition of Academic scepticism, in opposition to the dogmatism of the Stoics and the Epicureans. Clitomachus rejected the idea of absolute certainty and proposed that our judgements be founded on what is probable rather than what is certain. After the death of Carneades, he did not merely defend his master’s ideas: he deepened, organised and extended them, giving Academic scepticism its most accomplished form.

None of his writings has survived directly, yet his influence permeates Greco-Roman philosophy, notably through the works of Cicero. Clitomachus thus embodies an erudite ancient Tunisia—discreet, yet essential to the history of universal thought.

A philosophy of the probable for a world of uncertainty

Clitomachus’s thought rests on two pillars:

the rejection of absolute certainty;
the adoption of probability as a criterion for judgement and action.

For him, our perceptions and reasoning are always susceptible to error. Unlike the Stoics, who believed that completely reliable knowledge was attainable, Clitomachus held that we can never reach such a level of certainty.

Confronted with this fragility, he did not advocate withdrawal from the world, but rather an art of decision-making amid uncertainty. He distinguished several degrees of probability—simple, confirmed, then confirmed and coherent—which allow one to act without falling into dogmatism. What matters is not “knowing once and for all”, but accepting that our judgements must be continually reassessed in light of new information.

Clitomachus thus stands at the heart of an ancient debate—between fate and freedom, certainty and doubt—which resonates with particular force today. His critique of Stoic fatalism and of the astrological beliefs of his time echoes our contemporary struggles against conspiratorial narratives, mass disinformation and ready-made truths.

Formulated more than two thousand years ago, his principles speak to our era saturated with information and rumours:

beware of easy certainties;
accept uncertainty as a normal condition;
act on the basis of what is most probable, without claiming to possess ultimate truth.

Clitomachus’s probabilistic scepticism is not a philosophy of paralysis, but a school of vigilance, prudence and responsibility.

A missing pillar of the Tunisian pantheon

In the Council of Ministers’ chamber at the Carthage Palace, the Tunisian president placed, like four sentinels of Tunisianity, the tutelary figures watching over the young Republic: Hannibal the strategist, Jugurtha the resister, Ibn Khaldun the thinker, and above all Saint Augustine, the Carthaginian who managed to hold together faith and reason.

But this pantheon still lacks a purely philosophical figure, born of its soil, embodying the strength of critical thought and rational dialogue: Clitomachus. His philosophy reminds us that the search for truth is a path, not a fixed block; that it requires doubt, the confrontation of arguments, and the refusal of overly simple answers.

In a world where truth often seems elusive, where extremist narratives and media manipulation proliferate, Clitomachus offers us a precious antidote:

constructive doubt rather than cynicism;
enlightened inquiry rather than blind belief;
reasonable probability rather than fanatical certainty.

Just as fruitful connections were once drawn between Saint Augustine and Plato, Clitomachus can extend another synthesis: that of faith, reason and rational inquiry—an integral part of the Mediterranean’s deeper identity. To add him to the Tunisian pantheon would be to assert loudly that Tunisia is defined not only by the sword or dogma, but also by the mind, debate, enlightened doubt and the pursuit of truth.

An act of cultural reappropriation

Far from representing an inward-looking identity claim, the recognition of Clitomachus would strengthen the image of Tunisia as a crossroads of civilisations—open and conscious of the richness of its past. It would in fact extend Bourguiba’s most fertile intuition: to situate Tunisia not within a narrow identity, but within a plural, Mediterranean and universalist historical continuity.

Granting Clitomachus an explicit place within the Tunisian pantheon would be an essential gesture of cultural reappropriation. It would amount to affirming that critical thought, philosophy and knowledge are not merely imported from elsewhere: they were also produced here, in Carthage, by a Tunisian before the word existed.

Such a gesture would help rebalance a Tunisian collective imagination too often turned towards external references, even though Tunisia possesses an immense, under-exploited intellectual heritage of its own. Instead of citing only the poets of the jāhiliyya or distant figures, it would mean placing at the centre our own thinkers, our own sages—those who spoke from this land.

Restoring Clitomachus and other Carthaginian or Mediterranean figures to our symbolic horizon does not fragment the nation; on the contrary, it reconfigures our past in the sense described by Paul Ricoeur: changing the meaning of that past by rereading it differently. It is not about resurrecting rival identities, but about stitching back together what has been torn apart: recreating a common narrative, strengthening the sense of belonging and fostering a deeper cohesion among Tunisians, united around a plural history that is fully assumed and fully claimed. Only under these conditions will we be able to face together the challenges of development and finally offer young people a future worthy of their aspirations.

Translated from the article written in French on the Tunisian media outlet Business News.

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Tunisia: a possible US – facilitated recovery?

Ghazi Ben Ahmed — Thu, 27 Nov 2025 21:38:14 +0000

Tunisia has the possibility to explore a new approach towards economic recovery beyond its traditional resources (agriculture, phosphates, tourism, mechanical wares, real estate opportunities, energy projects, etc.) by exploiting the healthcare services sector with European customers and US investors.
Singapore’s case could provide some inspirations, but the essential requirements are a careful navigation of the complexities of its forthcoming transition and avoiding the repetition of past missteps.

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Morocco’s Generation Z 212: A New Echo of the Arab Spring

Ahmed Lagha — Thu, 27 Nov 2025 21:21:39 +0000

On December 17, 2010, the Tunisian Revolution began when a young street vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, set himself on fire after being humiliated by the municipal police of Sidi Bouzid.

The popular uprisings that followed his self-immolation marked the starting point of the Arab Spring, inspiring widespread protest movements across the Maghreb and the broader Arab world.

In Morocco, the monarchy managed to anticipate, absorb, and neutralize the unrest while preserving its image as the nation’s stabilizing arbiter.

However, today, with the rise of the “Generation Z 212” movement, some analysts see what they describe as a delayed spark of the Arab Spring: a new form of revolt, without leaders or political parties, expressing a similar frustration—this time in the digital age.

Since late September 2025, Morocco has been experiencing an unprecedented wave of protests driven by young people determined to make their voices heard. In several cities—Rabat, Casablanca, Tangier, Marrakech, and Agadir—thousands of youths gather to demand dignity, social justice, and better living conditions. Born out of a tragedy at the Agadir hospital, where several women lost their lives during childbirth, the movement has evolved into a collective cry against inequalities that have become unbearable.

This generation, nicknamed “Generation Z 212,” organizes itself without leaders or parties: everything happens online, through Discord or TikTok, where decisions are made collectively. The digital sphere is no longer just a space for expression but a real political arena and a shared space of consciousness.

Their demands are clear: access to education and healthcare, the fight against corruption, public transparency, and a reorientation of national priorities. Many denounce the contrast between massive investments in sports infrastructure ahead of the 2030 World Cup and the deterioration of public services.

But beyond immediate demands, it is a quest for dignity that drives these young people. They are fighting not only for jobs but for recognition and social justice. Despite arrests and moments of tension, the movement’s maturity and its ability to remain peaceful command respect.

What is happening in Morocco today goes beyond a national protest: it signals the emergence of an Arab and African youth that refuses silence, invents new forms of participation, and redefines the relationship between the governed and the governing.

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The Case for Regime Change in Iran and the Urgency of Regional Realignment

Ghazi Ben Ahmed — Wed, 06 Aug 2025 18:35:14 +0000

The United States has shattered a long-standing strategic taboo. By directly targeting the Iranian nuclear facilities of Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan, once deemed politically untouchable, Operation Midnight Hammer marked a decisive and inevitable turn. “We’re not at war with Iran,” U.S. Vice President JD Vance said. “We’re at war with Iran’s nuclear program.” More than a tactical warning, the strikes signaled the end of strategic ambiguity. The real question now is not whether this will be repeated. It almost certainly will, as Iran is already preparing its response, but whether the international community is finally willing to resolve, once and for all, the ambiguity surrounding Iran’s nuclear program.

For over two decades, the Islamic Republic of Iran has exploited diplomacy while secretly advancing its nuclear program. Parallel to this, it has entrenched itself across the region through an expansive network of proxies, from Hezbollah to the Houthis. Iran was reportedly aware of Hamas’s planning ahead of the October 7th massacre, underscoring its role as the orchestrator-in-chief of regional instability. Despite sanctions and negotiations, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has pursued nuclear capabilities with unwavering resolve, as confirmed by recent IAEA reports and European officials. French Armed Forces Minister Sébastien Lecornu bluntly acknowledged: Iran possesses all components needed to build a nuclear bomb.

The recent strikes, though bold, have uncertain results. Conflicting reports obscure the damage inflicted on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. What is certain is that Iran retains much, if not all, of its offensive capabilities. Believingotherwise is dangerously naïve. Iran’s nuclear knowledge cannot be bombed out of existence. As Kelsey Davenport of the Arms Control Association notes, Iran can rebuild faster than ever.

This is why regime change in Iran is not a rhetorical flourish but a strategic necessity. So long as the Islamic Republic survives, the region remains hostage to its ambitions. And that change must come from within.

Iranians are not silent. From the Green Movement to the more recent “Woman, Life, Freedom” uprisings, the people have made clear their yearning for a different future. Crushed, censored, surveilled, yet unbroken, they represent the only legitimate force capable of breaking this cycle of aggression and repression. Opposition figures like Reza Pahlavi have called this a historic window of opportunity to dismantle a regime that has failed its people and endangered its neighbors.

But ending Tehran’s malign influence also requires addressing the regional autocracies that shield and amplify it. Chief among them: Algeria.

Algeria has positioned itself as Iran’s key ally in North Africa. Its regime, repressive and unaccountable, has tightened its ties with Tehran while projecting strong influence over neighboring Tunisia, that became a swing country. Under President Kaïs Saïd, Tunisia has drifted dangerously toward authoritarianism, encouraged and supported by Algiers. Iranian-linked institutions are now operating inside Tunisia’s borders, including the controversial Ahl al-Bayt Center and newly established Shiite mosques. A once-proud secular and Sunni country is now vulnerable to ideological infiltration and sectarian manipulation.

At the heart of this Iran-Algeria-Tunisia axis lies the Polisario Front, a separatist movement armed and supported by Iran and Algeria, and increasingly legitimized by Tunisian diplomacy. This is not passive alignment; it is a coordinated challenge to regional stability and to Western-aligned states like Morocco.

These developments are not isolated. They reflect a coordinated architecture aimed at exporting instability and opposing Western engagement. Algeria plays a dangerous double game: forging closer ties with Iran while courting Western powers through energy diplomacy. It is time to call this what it is: strategic ambiguity.

What the MENA region needs is a clean break from the doctrines of authoritarian consolidation and ambiguity. A democratic Iran, free from the grip of the clerical regime, could serve as a linchpin for a new, inclusive security architecture. But such a future also requires containing the authoritarian regimes that act as Tehran’s enablers.

This realignment must also include a just solution for the Palestinian people, one that is not hijacked by Iranian-backed militias like Hamas, but rooted in legitimate statehood, accountability, and coexistence. The suffering of the Palestinians must no longer serve as a cynical pretext for geopolitical manipulation by toxic regimes that exploit their cause while doing nothing to advance it. A genuine solution is needed not slogans, not proxy wars.

On Iran’s periphery, autonomous aspirations are growing. Among Kurds and Baluchis, suppressed identities are resurfacing. Syria’s Kurds are closer than ever to achieving autonomy; Iraq’s Kurds have set a precedent. In the event of the regime’s collapse, new federated or independent structures could emerge, not as imperial designs, but as organic responses to longstanding grievances.

Meanwhile, in the Gulf, former adversaries of Iran are recalibrating. Saudi Arabia’s recent normalization with Tehran and the UAE’s pragmatic re-engagement reflect a shift driven less by trust in Iran’s intentions than by concerns over regional stability and perceptions of American disengagement. While these moves may offer short-term de-escalation, they risk legitimizing a regime that continues to export instability. Without a clear and principled counterweight, this détente could embolden Tehran rather than contain it.

We must not cling to illusions. The Islamic Republic will not reform itself. It will not be deterred by sanctions or rhetorical condemnations. While Tehran may not be planning a direct repeat of October 7, it is almost certainly exploring options to strike back, timed for maximum political and psychological impact, particularly when U.S. vulnerabilities are exposed. These calculations are unlikely to be uniform across the regime; rather, they are the subject of intense internal debate among the various factions of power, hardliners, pragmatists, and the security establishment, each weighing the risks, timing, and costs of escalation. For the Islamic Republic, harming American or Israeli interests is not only strategic, it is deeply woven into its revolutionary identity.

Regime change in Iran, and the containment of its regional enablers, is the only path toward stability, sovereignty, and shared prosperity in the MENA region. Stability in the Middle East is incompatible with the survival of the Islamic Republic. The time for half-measures is over. Should Donald Trump choose to fully back this historic moment, by weakening the Iranian regime and accentuating its vulnerabilities and enabling a decisive regional realignment, he could not only reshape the global order but also earn something few would have imagined: the Nobel Peace Prize.

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Staged and Shamed: How Kaïs Saied Used the U.S. to Boost His Regime

Ghazi Ben Ahmed — Wed, 06 Aug 2025 18:26:47 +0000

In the gilded halls of Carthage Palace, Tunisian President Kaïs Saied delivered what was meant to look like a principled stand. In reality, it was a carefully choreographed ambush. When Massad Boulos, adviser to Donald Trump on Arab and African affairs, arrived in Tunis, he was met not with the customary decorum of diplomacy, but with a solemn and theatrical display: graphic images of Palestinian suffering, accusations of genocide, and a scathing indictment of Israeli policy. There was no attempt at dialogue, no pretense of cooperation. It was a lecture and a performance.

The tragedy unfolding in Gaza is real, and it warrants global attention. But so too is the political manipulation that often cloaks itself in righteous outrage. That an authoritarian figure like Kaïs Saied was the one delivering the message, and that the United States handed him the platform to do so, is what should trouble policymakers in Washington. Whether out of naïveté or miscalculation, the U.S. gifted a struggling strongman the opportunity to polish his image at their expense, and Saied seized it with precision.

What played out in Tunis was not an isolated misstep. It was part of a well-worn script used by autocrats across the region, a performance steeped in ambiguity, crafted to appeal to Western sensitivities while masking the hard truth of domestic repression. When legitimacy falters at home, when economies collapse and dissent simmers, the Palestinian cause becomes the go-to refuge. It offers moral cover, international headlines, and a distraction from domestic decay. From Tehran to Algiers, and now Tunis, the tactic is the same.

Facing Tunisia’s most severe crisis in decades, economic freefall, international isolation, and an erosion of civil liberties, Saied resorted to this playbook. The display wasn’t meant to advance Palestinian rights. It was meant to deflect, to rally support, and to reframe himself as a moral voice in a region where he’s anything but.

This is a man who suspended parliament, dismantled judicial independence, jailed journalists, and crushed dissent. This is a leader who revived ties with Bashar al-Assad, the architect of mass atrocities against the Syrian people. Thousands of children were murdered under Assad’s regime, gassed, burned, and bombed, yet Saied saw no contradiction in welcoming him back into the diplomatic fold. To denounce Israeli brutality while embracing the butcher of Damascus isn’t just hypocrisy, it’s moral bankruptcy.

The meeting with Boulos offered Saied something he rarely gets these days: international validation. And he used it not to engage, but to perform. He wasn’t speaking to America; he was speaking through America, to a domestic audience he hopes to galvanize and to regional powers drawn to the toxic blend of populism and authoritarianism he now embodies. The message was clear: I stand defiant, I resist pressure, I defend Palestine. Never mind the Tunisians enduring rising poverty, censorship, and fear under his rule.

What did Washington expect to gain from this encounter? Influence? Leverage? The result was a photo op turned political weapon. And it underscores a deeper problem: the U.S. continues to treat repressive regimes as if they are rational actors in a shared rules-based order. But today’s autocrats aren’t just governing, they’re staging performances, and unless America understands that, it will continue being cast in roles it never auditioned for.

What makes this all the more damaging is the silence that follows. As Saied brands political opponents as traitors, lashes out at NGOs, and tightens his grip on power, Washington offers little more than muted concern. In trying not to interfere, it inadvertently enables, signaling that the theater works, that ambiguity pays off, that the show can go on.

And in the end, it’s the Palestinian cause that suffers. It deserves real defenders, leaders who fight for dignity abroad and uphold it at home. Not those who wave images of the dead while presiding over a nation in despair.

There is no shame in seeking dialogue. But diplomacy requires clarity, preparation, and strength of purpose — especially when engaging with leaders skilled in manipulation and spectacle. In Tunis, Massad Boulos was not outmaneuvered; he was unprepared. Tasked with representing a strategic vision for U.S. engagement in the region, he allowed himself to become a passive participant in KaïsSaied’s political theater.

We may never know what was truly said behind closed doors. American diplomacy may have preferred to deliver its messages discreetly. But in the court of public perception, the effect was disastrous. The images served Saied, not the mission Boulos was sent to defend. Far from strategic diplomacy, it was a miscalculation that offered Saied the perfect optics: a stage to posture, a foreign guest to legitimize him, and a headline to mask his domestic failures.

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Maghreb on Edge: Are North African Relations Beyond Repair?

Ahmed Lagha — Fri, 27 Jun 2025 20:40:00 +0000

Are relations between the countries of the Maghreb, or more broadly North Africa, doomed to failure? Was the AMU (Arab Maghreb Union) nipped in the bud, despite the good intentions of its founders?

In recent weeks, the heated news from the Maghreb, Africa and the Near and Middle East has only added fuel to the fire, if we consider the political relations between the different countries that make up North Africa.

In the Maghreb, since my previous article on Tunisia’s perspective on the Sahara territorial conflict, diplomatic relations between Tunisia and Morocco have deteriorated significantly.

In a bombshell development, it is rumoured that at the end of the Eid al-Fitr celebrations, a telephone call took place between Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune and Tunisian President Kaïs Saïed, during which the transfer to Tunisia of certain Polisario Front figures currently living in camps in western Algeria was discussed. The Algerian government’s objective is to avoid any accusations of supporting terrorism, particularly since Algeria was placed on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) grey list.

Such allegations do not reflect the words of our late President Habib Bourguiba, father of the Tunisian nation, who advocated Tunisia’s positive neutrality in the territorial conflict between Algiers and Rabat, Algeria and Morocco. During the 1970s, Tunis adopted a conciliatory stance between the two countries, promoting the idea of neutrality to each of the belligerents and external forces involved.

Indeed, it should be remembered that the different international positions in support of Moroccan or independent Sahara (Algeria’s position) only add fuel to the fire and reinforce tensions between the two neighbouring countries.

Recent events have brought Tunisia face to face with a problematic chapter in its diplomatic history with Morocco, which sees this history as a blow to relations between the two countries as a whole.

We should also recall the fraternal words of King Hassan II in March 1980, in the aftermath of the events in Gafsa, Tunisia, where armed action was orchestrated at the time by Libya and Algeria to bring down the Tunisian regime:

‘Tunisia will never be destabilised because it is first and foremost a people, and you cannot destabilise a people […] But to erase the subconscious and conscious mind of the Tunisian people (…) you would need an atomic bomb to wipe it off the map completely.’

Finally, Tunisians, Algerians, Libyans and Moroccans have embarked on a bus journey from Tunis to Cairo to stage a protest march against the Israeli government: ultimately, the Maghreb may not be as distant as we really think, except for Cairo’s desire to raise the question of North African hegemony…

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Trapped by Its Own Model: Algeria at the Edge

Ghazi Ben Ahmed — Sun, 20 Apr 2025 20:53:01 +0000

With Donald Trump’s return to the White House, Arab powers are racing to secure Washington’s favor. From Riyadh to Abu Dhabi, regional giants are pledging massive U.S. investments—$600 billion from Saudi Arabia, $1.4 trillion over a decade from the UAE—targeting AI, semiconductors, and energy. Amid this geopolitical bidding war, Algeria—long known for its cautious, non-aligned foreign policy—has made a series of unexpected moves

After years of resisting deeper ties with the U.S., Algiers abruptly signed a military agreement with AFRICOM and followed it with an energy deal with ExxonMobil. These rapid overtures seem less a strategic pivot than a sign of regime anxiety—an attempt to stay relevant in a new order defined by transactional diplomacy. But unlike the Gulf monarchies, Algeria lacks financial clout or strategic leverage. It remains a regional giant with feet of clay: economically fragile, diplomatically isolated, and increasingly adrift.

At the heart of Algeria’s outreach lies one goal: recalibrating U.S. policy on Western Sahara. Since Morocco normalized ties with Israel, Washington—particularly under the Trump administration—has backed Rabat’s claim over the disputed territory, marginalizing Algeria’s historic support for Sahrawi self-determination. That support was recently reaffirmed on April 8^th, 2025, when U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio visited Rabat and publicly reiterated America’s recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over the Sahara, marking a further blow to Algeria’s diplomatic posture. While Algiers continues to block the UN-led political process and refuses to engage as a responsible stakeholder, the narrative in Washington is hardening. U.S. Congressman Joe Wilson recently announced, “I will introduce legislation to designate the Polisario as terrorists. Iran & Putin gaining a foothold in Africa via Polisario. Connect the dots: axis of aggression.” This stark framing no longer views the Polisario as a liberation movement, but as a proxy within a broader authoritarian alliance. Algeria is no longer just isolated — it’s exposed. Behind the talk of sovereignty lies a regime openly backing Iran, Russia, and a separatist militia now described in Washington as part of an “axis of aggression.” The mask has fallen.

Officially, Algeria upholds non-interference and peaceful resolution. In practice, it has long aligned with authoritarian regimes—most notably Iran and the now-fallen Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad. These ties, rooted in anti-Western solidarity and opposition to Gulf influence, have left Algeria increasingly out of step with shifting Arab consensus. Algiers remained one of Assad’s last defenders, facilitating Polisario presence in Syria.

Officially, Algeria upholds non-interference and peaceful resolution. In practice, it has long aligned itself with authoritarian regimes—most notably Iran and the now-fallen Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad. These ties, rooted in anti-Western solidarity and opposition to Gulf influence, have left Algeria increasingly out of sync with the evolving Arab consensus. Algiers remained one of Assad’s last defenders, facilitating Polisario presence in Syria even as other Arab states distanced themselves. Over the years, Iran has cultivated a wide web of proxies to advance its regional influence. According to The Washington Post, this includes training fighters from the Algeria-backed Polisario Front—nominally focused on Western Sahara, but increasingly embedded in Tehran’s broader militant network. Today, hundreds of these fighters have been detained by Syria’s post-Assad security forces, underscoring just how entangled the Polisario had become in Iran’s shadow wars. This exposure not only further discredits Algeria’s narrative of neutrality, but also reveals the dangerous externalization of a conflict it claims to keep within diplomatic bounds.

Furthermore, maintaining ties with Iran and its alignment with groups like Hamas—while consistent with Algeria’s historical support for Palestine—risks deepening its rift with key Western and Arab partners at a time when strategic neutrality is increasingly difficult to sustain.

With Assad gone and Iran under maximum pressure, Algeria’s authoritarian alliances are crumbling—exposing its strategic vulnerability. Behind its non-interference rhetoric lies a regime that instinctively sides with autocrats, driven by fear of democratic contagion. Since the Arab Spring, Algiers has resisted reform, backing repression over change. Now, as old alliances crumble, it stands increasingly alone—trapped by a model it cannot abandon without threatening the very foundations of its regime.

Meanwhile, regional pressures on Algeria are intensifying. The Sahel is unraveling under successive coups and Russian mercenary influence, Libya remains unstable, and ties with Morocco are frozen over Western Sahara and normalization with Israel. Algeria’s quiet support for Tunisia’s president Kaïs Saïed only adds to its exposure. Once a buffer, Tunisia is now a source of instability—politically repressive, economically paralyzed, and diplomatically shunned.

A collapse could send shockwaves across the border, triggering economic contagion, insecurity, and unrest in Algeria itself, where stagnation, high unemployment, and a disillusioned youth are already testing the regime’s limits.

These mounting pressures are unfolding against a backdrop of economic fragility. Energy remains the backbone of Algeria’s economy—accounting for 98% of exports—but it no longer ensures strategic relevance. As global markets accelerate toward renewables, Algeria failed to seize critical opportunities—particularly during Europe’s pivot away from Russian gas. Years of under-investment, corruption, and mismanagement have stifled production and innovation. Rather than driving transformation, hydrocarbon revenues are increasingly used as a political safety valve—buying social peace in moments of tension, but reinforcing the rentier status quo instead of reforming it.

What Algeria faces today is not a policy crossroads—it is a regime dilemma. Reforming the economy would require dismantling the opaque patronage networks that control the distribution of oil and gas rents. These networks have long shielded the regime from accountability, entrenched elite control, and stifled entrepreneurship. Reform would mean loosening the system’s grip on power. Refusal would accelerate decline.

Algeria is no longer just drifting — it is decaying in plain sight. A regime built on oil rents and military rule is now out of time, out of ideas, and out of allies. It clings to outdated alliances, obstructs diplomatic progress, and resists every pressure to reform — not out of strategy, but out of fear. Fear of accountability. Fear of its own people. But this equilibrium of repression and denial is brittle — and it may not hold much longer. The spark could come any time from within, or it could arrive from across the border. Tunisia’s deepening unrest — political paralysis, social explosion, economic collapse — is unfolding next door, and its aftershocks will not stop at the frontier. The anger swelling in Tunis today mirrors the frustration simmering in Algiers. And when pressure builds in parallel, collapse often comes in waves. Algerians have endured too much for too long. They deserve more than a system built to preserve power — not serve the people.

This article was written by our founder Ghazi Ben Ahmed on the media The Geopolitics.The Geopolitics (TGP) is a uniquely global source of news, analysis and commentary on current geopolitical issues, politics and international relations.

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Morocco and the Reform of the Moudawana

Ahmed Lagha — Sat, 04 Jan 2025 20:56:00 +0000

The Moudawana, or Moroccan Personal Status Code, is a set of laws governing personal status issues, including marriage, divorce, child custody, inheritance, and family relations in Morocco. Playing a central role in regulating the rights and duties of family members, it was first adopted in 1957/58, following Morocco’s independence.

The Moudawana long reflected a traditional and patriarchal vision of society. However, growing criticism over gender inequality and insufficient protection of women’s rights led to a major revision in 2004, spearheaded by King Mohammed VI, who aimed to safeguard women’s rights while respecting Islamic principles.

The 2004 reform introduced key changes: equality between spouses, raising the legal marriage age from 15 to 18, stricter regulation of polygamy, allowing women to file for divorce under specific circumstances, and reforms in child custody and inheritance.

In late 2024, another revision to the Moudawana brought additional reforms: Moroccan women can now be legal guardians of their children (retaining custody even after remarriage), couples can divorce amicably without court intervention, and wives can prohibit polygamy at the time of marriage.

However, the lack of parity in inheritance laws remains a critical issue, mirroring the situation in Tunisia and serving as a significant obstacle to progressive societal evolution in North Africa.

In Tunisia, for instance, former President Beji Caid Essebsi proposed a historic reform in 2018 to establish gender equality in inheritance. This initiative was part of his broader project to modernize women’s rights and aligned with Tunisia’s progressive legacy in gender equality. Yet, discussions around these legislative proposals remain unresolved.

The fight for more progressive North African societies is far from over, but the efforts made in our time are far from insignificant.

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Transactionally Yours: The EU and Tunisia Confront Their Own Contradictions

Ahmed Lagha — Sun, 17 Nov 2024 19:32:17 +0000

October 29-30, 2024, will mark the resumption of negotiations between Tunisia and the European Union, represented by the Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG Near, managing the Tunisia dossier and holding the purse strings) and the European External Action Service (EEAS, responsible for policy direction). This meeting in Tunis, the first during Kaïs Saïed’s second term, aims to discuss the details of implementing the migration memorandum signed on July 16, 2023.

To better grasp the stakes of this meeting, it is crucial to demystify the narratives underlying EU-Tunisia relations. On one side, the EU justifies its transactional strategy as an effort to stabilize Tunisia and prevent it from pivoting toward geopolitical adversaries like Russia and China (implicitly due to a lack of European cooperation). On the other, Tunisian President Kaïs Saïed portrays himself to supporters as a staunch defender of national sovereignty, publicly rejecting the role of Europe’s “coastguard” while discreetly cooperating at a minimal level with European entities like Frontex to stop migrants from heading to Europe, rescue them at sea, and facilitate their repatriation.

However, this limited cooperation does not satisfy the Europeans, who are desperately seeking to intensify collaboration by proposing the establishment of readmission hubs with their partners. A growing idea is the creation of dedicated return centers outside the Schengen area, in third countries. For the EU27, the objective is clear: accelerate deportations at any cost, with little regard for ethical concerns. This tightening of readmission mechanisms reflects Europe’s frenzy to strengthen its migration policies, increasingly outsourcing management to partner countries like Tunisia, now central to this strategy.

In Tunisia’s current context, marked by a severe economic crisis, this initiative could represent an opportunity to replenish the country’s desperately empty state coffers. The critical question is: how far can Kaïs Saïed maintain his sovereignty rhetoric in the face of European demands? Will he be forced to accept transactional compromises to save the country’s economy? This question is even more pressing for the Europeans as it arises against the backdrop of recent failures in British and Italian projects to outsource asylum-seeker management to Rwanda and Albania, respectively.

Nevertheless, this transactional approach carries significant risks. By supporting an increasingly authoritarian regime, the EU risks complicity in human rights abuses intensifying under Saïed’s presidency, thereby undermining its own legitimacy as a defender of democratic values.

Faced with an authoritarian drift in Tunisia, the EU treads an increasingly unsustainable tightrope, oscillating between a minimal facade of respect for democratic principles and the need to maintain functional relations with a key partner in security and migration management. This precarious stance is further strained by investigations, such as those by The Guardian, alleging severe abuses by EU-funded Tunisian security forces, including sexual violence and flagrant human rights violations against migrants (officially denied by Tunisia). Pressure is mounting for Brussels to account for its knowledge of these abuses and outline corrective measures, even as EU funds continue to support this repressive regime. Moreover, DG Near reportedly anticipated such abuses in an internal note that was later buried.

Transactionally Yours: A Bluffing Game

Ultimately, the fate of these negotiations will depend on Kaïs Saïed’s ability to balance his political ambitions with Tunisia’s immediate needs, particularly securing direct budgetary support and an EU loan without IMF conditions, as promised by Giorgia Meloni. Having already accepted the role of Europe’s border guard during the Memorandum’s signing in July 2023, Saïed is likely to go even further this time, buying time to secure financial relief while advancing his rapprochement with the BRICS, particularly Russia. Migration, the sole remaining link between Saïed and a Europe he constantly criticizes, once again becomes the linchpin of a compromise, muting his anti-Western rhetoric and defiance of perceived diktats.

Meanwhile, Europe, consumed by the urgency of migration challenges, seems ready to abandon a core pillar of the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which initiated development cooperation, and current treaties such as the Treaty on European Union (Article 21) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Article 208). These treaties define principles aimed at reducing poverty and promoting sustainable development. The cooperation budget is now redirected toward a securitized and repressive day-to-day management of migration. This philosophical shift is aptly summarized by a tweet from French Minister for European Affairs Benjamin Haddad on October 24, 2024: “Time for realism. Europe must stop seeing itself as a vast market or an NGO defending universal values and instead think of itself as a political entity with its own economic and security interests.”

However, reducing Europe solely to economic and security realism forgets that its strength lies in the balance between market, security, and universal values. If Europe abandons its defense of human rights and solidarity principles, it will lose not only its soul but also the influence that allows it to build partnerships based on trust and respect. Viewing Europe merely as a cold political entity risks a reductive vision, distancing it from what has made it successful and differentiates it from countries like Putin’s Russia.

Ultimately, these negotiations resemble a high-stakes poker game where both sides strategically advance their interests, concealing true intentions behind official statements. Europe, fixated on managing migration and driven by pressure amplified by far-right parties exploiting the issue for political gain, and Tunisia, economically strangled, are engaged in a game where pragmatic interests outweigh declared principles. Alarmist rhetoric about migrants primarily serves domestic political objectives, distracting from real issues and reinforcing a transactional approach at the expense of democratic values and human rights. Behind the facade of cooperation, power dynamics and economic survival dictate the actions of both parties, far from the proclaimed ideals of sovereignty and democratic values.

This article was posted and translated by Ahmed Lagha but was originally written by Maxence Vanhille for the Tunisian digital newspaper Business News in French.

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