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An Oil Shock Tunisia Cannot Absorb Without Structural Reforms

Ghazi Ben Ahmed — Mon, 30 Mar 2026 17:07:19 +0000

Brent crude settled at $79.45 on March 1 — before the strike on the Ras Tanura refinery operated by Saudi Aramco, before major shipping lines suspended transit through the Strait of Hormuz, and before mounting security alerts signaled that this narrow waterway – conduit for nearly one-fifth of global oil flows – had become a strategic flashpoint.

The price visible on trading screens reflects transactions already executed; it does not fully incorporate routes disrupted, insurance premiums recalculated, and supply chains placed under geopolitical constraint. Markets continue to treat oil primarily as a commodity. Yet in the Strait of Hormuz, it is increasingly subject to geopolitical leverage.

For Tunisia, this shift is not theoretical. It has direct macroeconomic consequences.

A Budget Assumption Under Strain

Tunisia’s 2026 Finance Law is built on an assumed average oil price of $63.3 per barrel. Current levels stand well above that reference. The deviation is economically significant.

Each additional dollar in the price of oil adds approximately 164 million dinars to compensation expenditures. This mechanism is automatic: higher import costs expand subsidy requirements, widening the fiscal deficit unless offset by higher revenues or expenditure restraint.

At $80 per barrel, fiscal pressure intensifies. At $90, adjustment becomes considerably more difficult. At $100, the budgetary impact is substantial and sustained.

Tunisia enters this phase with elevated public debt, rigid expenditure structures dominated by wages, subsidies, and debt servicing, and limited access to international capital markets. In such a configuration, the scope for discretionary counter-cyclical policy is structurally constrained.

Inflation Through Production and Imports

The oil shock extends beyond public finances. Energy is a core input in transport, electricity generation, agriculture, and manufacturing. Petroleum derivatives are embedded in plastics, packaging, fertilizers, and numerous industrial processes. Tunisia also imports finished goods from economies where energy prices are not subsidized, meaning higher oil prices are transmitted directly through import costs.

The consequence is imported inflation.

According to Capital Economics, a prolonged conflict pushing oil to $100 per barrel could add between 0.6 and 0.7 percentage points to global inflation. For Tunisia, such an increase would translate into higher consumer prices, further compressing purchasing power at a time when households are already adjusting to elevated living costs.

Inflation in this context is not merely a statistical outcome; it has distributive effects, disproportionately affecting lower- and middle-income households whose consumption baskets are more sensitive to energy and transport costs.

External Balances and Logistical Pressures

As a net importer of hydrocarbons, Tunisia’s trade balance is structurally sensitive to oil prices. A sustained rise in the energy bill deepens the current account deficit and places additional strain on foreign-exchange reserves; a key buffer for exchange-rate stability and external confidence.

Logistics compound this vulnerability. Maritime insurance premiums have increased amid instability affecting transit routes, particularly through the Suez Canal. Rerouting and security surcharges raise freight costs, affecting both consumer goods and intermediate inputs used in domestic production.

Meanwhile, JPMorgan Chase has noted that dozens of empty oil tankers are currently waiting near the Gulf region. Storage capacity in producing countries is limited to only a few days of output. Should disruptions persist, logistical bottlenecks could evolve into production constraints, reinforcing upward pressure on prices and prolonging market tightness.

Under such conditions, what begins as volatility risks becoming structural imbalance.

A Dual Shock in a Constrained Policy Environment

The present oil surge constitutes a dual shock for Tunisia:

Fiscal, through rising compensation costs and widening deficits;
Economic, through imported inflation, higher production expenses, and increased transport costs.

These channels interact. Larger subsidies expand borrowing needs; higher import bills weaken external balances; inflation erodes real incomes; slower growth limits revenue mobilization. The cumulative effect narrows policy options further.

Tunisia’s vulnerability is structural. The economy remains heavily dependent on imported hydrocarbons to sustain transport, electricity generation, and industry. Export diversification remains limited, and foreign-currency earnings are insufficient to offset large energy import bills. Fiscal rigidities reduce flexibility precisely when flexibility is most needed.

Without structural reform – including accelerated investment in renewable energy, improved energy efficiency, enhanced export competitiveness, and a credible medium-term fiscal consolidation strategy – exposure to external energy shocks will persist.

Regional Context, Asymmetric Exposure

Tunisia is not alone in its sensitivity to oil prices. Morocco, also a net oil importer, faces similar exposure to prolonged price increases and imported inflation.

By contrast, Algeria, as a hydrocarbon exporter, benefits from higher prices in the short term. Yet its fiscal and external balances remain closely tied to energy revenues, and regional instability carries its own financial and security risks. Energy shocks reshape North African macroeconomic dynamics, albeit asymmetrically.

A Narrow Margin for Absorption

The Strait of Hormuz lies far from Tunis geographically, but its stability influences Tunisia’s fiscal trajectory, inflation path, reserve adequacy, and growth outlook. In an interconnected energy system, distance offers no insulation.

If oil prices stabilize quickly, Tunisia will face a demanding but manageable adjustment. If elevated prices persist, the convergence of fiscal expansion, external deterioration, and inflationary pressure could significantly constrain macroeconomic stability.

In this context, the gravest risk is not simply fiscal slippage or higher inflation, but a broader breakdown of economic stability; one that could weaken the dinar, exhaust foreign-exchange reserves, and trigger acute shortages. Such a configuration would not remain confined to macroeconomic indicators; it would carry profound social and political consequences in a country where economic strain has historically translated into systemic upheaval.

A further vulnerability lies in Tunisia’s increasingly constrained diplomatic positioning. External financial support cannot be assumed. In previous crises, Gulf countries provided liquidity backstops or budgetary assistance. Today, geopolitical alignments are more fragmented, and Tunisia’s ambiguous positioning in regional tensions may reduce the likelihood of rapid financial relief from traditional partners.

Should regional polarization intensify, economic repercussions could extend beyond capital flows. Labor mobility, remittance channels, and bilateral economic ties may become exposed to political recalibration. For countries such as Tunisia and Algeria, whose citizens maintain economic linkages across the Gulf, the risk is not only financial but also socio-economic.

In such a scenario and to conclude, the convergence of constrained external financing, accelerating dinar depreciation, reserve exhaustion, entrenched inflation, and disrupted remittance inflows would not merely intensify macroeconomic stress; it could transform what is currently treated as speculative risk into the premature unraveling of an already fragile economic system. An economy structurally dependent on external financing, weak in productive diversification, and unable to generate sustained growth or macroeconomic stability cannot indefinitely absorb cumulative shocks.

Under prolonged pressure, the outcome would not be a cyclical adjustment, but the materialization of a risk long feared yet seldom articulated: that sustained economic breakdown could once again trigger systemic political rupture. If left unaddressed, the consequences may extend beyond institutional instability to social fragmentation and lasting damage to the state itself. The question is no longer whether reform is necessary, but whether there is still time to act.

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Happy New Year 2026 from the MDI team!

Ghazi Ben Ahmed — Mon, 30 Mar 2026 16:54:41 +0000

Dear fellow citizens, devoted patriots,

As we enter the new year of 2026, my dearest wish is for the salvation of our homeland.

Tunisia stands at a crossroads: we must, above all, save it from bankruptcy, but also rid it of the poison of hatred and polarisation that divides us.

The Tunisian people deserve infinitely better than what they are enduring today. It is unacceptable that a people with a thousand-year-old heritage should be reduced to suffering the humiliation of shortages, the scourge of mass unemployment and the blight of pollution that chokes our cities. Let us finally choose practical action over sterile ideology. The recovery of our economy must no longer be a campaign promise, but our sole and only guiding principle.

Our vision is of a bold and competitive Tunisia. We have talents shining all over the world; it is time to create the conditions for them to build here, at home. We call for an economic revolution based on innovation, the energy transition and the unleashing of initiative.

Let us spare a special thought for our regions, such as Gabès, where the environment and the health of our fellow citizens have for too long been sacrificed on the altar of neglect. Environmental justice is the foundation of dignity. Let us stop diverting regional wealth; let us finally devote it to the priority development of those who produce and protect it.

Now is the time for unity and absolute autonomy.

Tunisia must no longer beg for its bread or sell off its sovereignty to anyone. We emphatically state that our country is not for sale and that its security cannot be delegated: our sovereignty will never be surrendered to Algerian interests or to any foreign power. Let us rely on our own strengths, on our creative genius and on unwavering solidarity with the most vulnerable. We will leave no one by the wayside.

The economic solutions to create wealth and decent jobs for all Tunisians are well known and within our grasp. We possess the necessary skills and our own resources to implement these solutions, so that we may seize our independence with our own hands. We no longer need to remain at the mercy of any country, nor wait for ‘aid’ that condemns us to live forever in the submission and humiliation of dependence.

We must choose our dignity, our ambition and genuine solidarity. Enough of empty slogans, and enough of this rhetoric of “toxic fraternity” which has brought us nothing but alienation. The time has come to stand shoulder to shoulder and rebuild our country, together.

May 2026 be the year of restored sovereignty, economic excellence and social justice. Let us make this the year in which Tunisia stops suffering and starts building again.

Long live Tunisia, free, prosperous and proud!

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Clitomachus of Carthage, the Tunisian philosopher our Republic needs!

Ghazi Ben Ahmed — Thu, 04 Dec 2025 19:52:59 +0000

Since independence, Tunisia has continuously sought to define the contours of an identity that is truly its own—both freed from the weight of colonial domination and liberated from reductive interpretations. The notion of “Tunisianity” belongs to this quest: not a single Arab-Muslim identity, but the heritage of a long historical layering in which Berbers, Punics, Romans, Christians, Arabs and other Mediterranean peoples have, successively or simultaneously, shaped this land.

Habib Bourguiba himself embodied this ambivalence. In the early years of independence, he favoured a unifying discourse centred on Arab-Muslim belonging, even distancing the Amazigh dimension, which he perceived as a potential threat to national unity. Yet, at the same time, he was profoundly aware of the richness of Tunisia’s ancient past and did not hesitate to symbolically place himself in the lineage of figures such as Hannibal or Saint Augustine. It is from this plural historical foundation that he paradoxically helped forge the basis of a modern Tunisianity: rooted in its historical depth, yet open to the Mediterranean and the wider world.

It is within this intellectual continuity that it becomes both relevant and necessary today to consider the integration of Clitomachus of Carthage into the Tunisian pantheon.

Clitomachus of Carthage: a Carthaginian at the heart of ancient philosophy

Clitomachus of Carthage, whose Carthaginian name was Hasdrubal, is one of the most fascinating yet most overlooked figures of ancient philosophy. Born in Carthage around 187 BC, he left his native city for Athens after the destruction of Carthage, where he became a disciple of Carneades and, later, the head of the New Academy.

His work forms part of the tradition of Academic scepticism, in opposition to the dogmatism of the Stoics and the Epicureans. Clitomachus rejected the idea of absolute certainty and proposed that our judgements be founded on what is probable rather than what is certain. After the death of Carneades, he did not merely defend his master’s ideas: he deepened, organised and extended them, giving Academic scepticism its most accomplished form.

None of his writings has survived directly, yet his influence permeates Greco-Roman philosophy, notably through the works of Cicero. Clitomachus thus embodies an erudite ancient Tunisia—discreet, yet essential to the history of universal thought.

A philosophy of the probable for a world of uncertainty

Clitomachus’s thought rests on two pillars:

the rejection of absolute certainty;
the adoption of probability as a criterion for judgement and action.

For him, our perceptions and reasoning are always susceptible to error. Unlike the Stoics, who believed that completely reliable knowledge was attainable, Clitomachus held that we can never reach such a level of certainty.

Confronted with this fragility, he did not advocate withdrawal from the world, but rather an art of decision-making amid uncertainty. He distinguished several degrees of probability—simple, confirmed, then confirmed and coherent—which allow one to act without falling into dogmatism. What matters is not “knowing once and for all”, but accepting that our judgements must be continually reassessed in light of new information.

Clitomachus thus stands at the heart of an ancient debate—between fate and freedom, certainty and doubt—which resonates with particular force today. His critique of Stoic fatalism and of the astrological beliefs of his time echoes our contemporary struggles against conspiratorial narratives, mass disinformation and ready-made truths.

Formulated more than two thousand years ago, his principles speak to our era saturated with information and rumours:

beware of easy certainties;
accept uncertainty as a normal condition;
act on the basis of what is most probable, without claiming to possess ultimate truth.

Clitomachus’s probabilistic scepticism is not a philosophy of paralysis, but a school of vigilance, prudence and responsibility.

A missing pillar of the Tunisian pantheon

In the Council of Ministers’ chamber at the Carthage Palace, the Tunisian president placed, like four sentinels of Tunisianity, the tutelary figures watching over the young Republic: Hannibal the strategist, Jugurtha the resister, Ibn Khaldun the thinker, and above all Saint Augustine, the Carthaginian who managed to hold together faith and reason.

But this pantheon still lacks a purely philosophical figure, born of its soil, embodying the strength of critical thought and rational dialogue: Clitomachus. His philosophy reminds us that the search for truth is a path, not a fixed block; that it requires doubt, the confrontation of arguments, and the refusal of overly simple answers.

In a world where truth often seems elusive, where extremist narratives and media manipulation proliferate, Clitomachus offers us a precious antidote:

constructive doubt rather than cynicism;
enlightened inquiry rather than blind belief;
reasonable probability rather than fanatical certainty.

Just as fruitful connections were once drawn between Saint Augustine and Plato, Clitomachus can extend another synthesis: that of faith, reason and rational inquiry—an integral part of the Mediterranean’s deeper identity. To add him to the Tunisian pantheon would be to assert loudly that Tunisia is defined not only by the sword or dogma, but also by the mind, debate, enlightened doubt and the pursuit of truth.

An act of cultural reappropriation

Far from representing an inward-looking identity claim, the recognition of Clitomachus would strengthen the image of Tunisia as a crossroads of civilisations—open and conscious of the richness of its past. It would in fact extend Bourguiba’s most fertile intuition: to situate Tunisia not within a narrow identity, but within a plural, Mediterranean and universalist historical continuity.

Granting Clitomachus an explicit place within the Tunisian pantheon would be an essential gesture of cultural reappropriation. It would amount to affirming that critical thought, philosophy and knowledge are not merely imported from elsewhere: they were also produced here, in Carthage, by a Tunisian before the word existed.

Such a gesture would help rebalance a Tunisian collective imagination too often turned towards external references, even though Tunisia possesses an immense, under-exploited intellectual heritage of its own. Instead of citing only the poets of the jāhiliyya or distant figures, it would mean placing at the centre our own thinkers, our own sages—those who spoke from this land.

Restoring Clitomachus and other Carthaginian or Mediterranean figures to our symbolic horizon does not fragment the nation; on the contrary, it reconfigures our past in the sense described by Paul Ricoeur: changing the meaning of that past by rereading it differently. It is not about resurrecting rival identities, but about stitching back together what has been torn apart: recreating a common narrative, strengthening the sense of belonging and fostering a deeper cohesion among Tunisians, united around a plural history that is fully assumed and fully claimed. Only under these conditions will we be able to face together the challenges of development and finally offer young people a future worthy of their aspirations.

Translated from the article written in French on the Tunisian media outlet Business News.

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Trapped by Its Own Model: Algeria at the Edge

Ghazi Ben Ahmed — Sun, 20 Apr 2025 20:53:01 +0000

With Donald Trump’s return to the White House, Arab powers are racing to secure Washington’s favor. From Riyadh to Abu Dhabi, regional giants are pledging massive U.S. investments—$600 billion from Saudi Arabia, $1.4 trillion over a decade from the UAE—targeting AI, semiconductors, and energy. Amid this geopolitical bidding war, Algeria—long known for its cautious, non-aligned foreign policy—has made a series of unexpected moves

After years of resisting deeper ties with the U.S., Algiers abruptly signed a military agreement with AFRICOM and followed it with an energy deal with ExxonMobil. These rapid overtures seem less a strategic pivot than a sign of regime anxiety—an attempt to stay relevant in a new order defined by transactional diplomacy. But unlike the Gulf monarchies, Algeria lacks financial clout or strategic leverage. It remains a regional giant with feet of clay: economically fragile, diplomatically isolated, and increasingly adrift.

At the heart of Algeria’s outreach lies one goal: recalibrating U.S. policy on Western Sahara. Since Morocco normalized ties with Israel, Washington—particularly under the Trump administration—has backed Rabat’s claim over the disputed territory, marginalizing Algeria’s historic support for Sahrawi self-determination. That support was recently reaffirmed on April 8^th, 2025, when U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio visited Rabat and publicly reiterated America’s recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over the Sahara, marking a further blow to Algeria’s diplomatic posture. While Algiers continues to block the UN-led political process and refuses to engage as a responsible stakeholder, the narrative in Washington is hardening. U.S. Congressman Joe Wilson recently announced, “I will introduce legislation to designate the Polisario as terrorists. Iran & Putin gaining a foothold in Africa via Polisario. Connect the dots: axis of aggression.” This stark framing no longer views the Polisario as a liberation movement, but as a proxy within a broader authoritarian alliance. Algeria is no longer just isolated — it’s exposed. Behind the talk of sovereignty lies a regime openly backing Iran, Russia, and a separatist militia now described in Washington as part of an “axis of aggression.” The mask has fallen.

Officially, Algeria upholds non-interference and peaceful resolution. In practice, it has long aligned with authoritarian regimes—most notably Iran and the now-fallen Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad. These ties, rooted in anti-Western solidarity and opposition to Gulf influence, have left Algeria increasingly out of step with shifting Arab consensus. Algiers remained one of Assad’s last defenders, facilitating Polisario presence in Syria.

Officially, Algeria upholds non-interference and peaceful resolution. In practice, it has long aligned itself with authoritarian regimes—most notably Iran and the now-fallen Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad. These ties, rooted in anti-Western solidarity and opposition to Gulf influence, have left Algeria increasingly out of sync with the evolving Arab consensus. Algiers remained one of Assad’s last defenders, facilitating Polisario presence in Syria even as other Arab states distanced themselves. Over the years, Iran has cultivated a wide web of proxies to advance its regional influence. According to The Washington Post, this includes training fighters from the Algeria-backed Polisario Front—nominally focused on Western Sahara, but increasingly embedded in Tehran’s broader militant network. Today, hundreds of these fighters have been detained by Syria’s post-Assad security forces, underscoring just how entangled the Polisario had become in Iran’s shadow wars. This exposure not only further discredits Algeria’s narrative of neutrality, but also reveals the dangerous externalization of a conflict it claims to keep within diplomatic bounds.

Furthermore, maintaining ties with Iran and its alignment with groups like Hamas—while consistent with Algeria’s historical support for Palestine—risks deepening its rift with key Western and Arab partners at a time when strategic neutrality is increasingly difficult to sustain.

With Assad gone and Iran under maximum pressure, Algeria’s authoritarian alliances are crumbling—exposing its strategic vulnerability. Behind its non-interference rhetoric lies a regime that instinctively sides with autocrats, driven by fear of democratic contagion. Since the Arab Spring, Algiers has resisted reform, backing repression over change. Now, as old alliances crumble, it stands increasingly alone—trapped by a model it cannot abandon without threatening the very foundations of its regime.

Meanwhile, regional pressures on Algeria are intensifying. The Sahel is unraveling under successive coups and Russian mercenary influence, Libya remains unstable, and ties with Morocco are frozen over Western Sahara and normalization with Israel. Algeria’s quiet support for Tunisia’s president Kaïs Saïed only adds to its exposure. Once a buffer, Tunisia is now a source of instability—politically repressive, economically paralyzed, and diplomatically shunned.

A collapse could send shockwaves across the border, triggering economic contagion, insecurity, and unrest in Algeria itself, where stagnation, high unemployment, and a disillusioned youth are already testing the regime’s limits.

These mounting pressures are unfolding against a backdrop of economic fragility. Energy remains the backbone of Algeria’s economy—accounting for 98% of exports—but it no longer ensures strategic relevance. As global markets accelerate toward renewables, Algeria failed to seize critical opportunities—particularly during Europe’s pivot away from Russian gas. Years of under-investment, corruption, and mismanagement have stifled production and innovation. Rather than driving transformation, hydrocarbon revenues are increasingly used as a political safety valve—buying social peace in moments of tension, but reinforcing the rentier status quo instead of reforming it.

What Algeria faces today is not a policy crossroads—it is a regime dilemma. Reforming the economy would require dismantling the opaque patronage networks that control the distribution of oil and gas rents. These networks have long shielded the regime from accountability, entrenched elite control, and stifled entrepreneurship. Reform would mean loosening the system’s grip on power. Refusal would accelerate decline.

Algeria is no longer just drifting — it is decaying in plain sight. A regime built on oil rents and military rule is now out of time, out of ideas, and out of allies. It clings to outdated alliances, obstructs diplomatic progress, and resists every pressure to reform — not out of strategy, but out of fear. Fear of accountability. Fear of its own people. But this equilibrium of repression and denial is brittle — and it may not hold much longer. The spark could come any time from within, or it could arrive from across the border. Tunisia’s deepening unrest — political paralysis, social explosion, economic collapse — is unfolding next door, and its aftershocks will not stop at the frontier. The anger swelling in Tunis today mirrors the frustration simmering in Algiers. And when pressure builds in parallel, collapse often comes in waves. Algerians have endured too much for too long. They deserve more than a system built to preserve power — not serve the people.

This article was written by our founder Ghazi Ben Ahmed on the media The Geopolitics.The Geopolitics (TGP) is a uniquely global source of news, analysis and commentary on current geopolitical issues, politics and international relations.

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Un pari perdant : La pression maximale de Trump face à l’agenda agressif de l’Iran

Ghazi Ben Ahmed — Mon, 25 Nov 2024 18:52:25 +0000

Lors de son premier mandat, Donald Trump a quitté l’accord nucléaire de 2015 (JCPOA) et lancé une campagne de “pression maximale” contre l’Iran. Bien que les sanctions aient lourdement frappé l’économie iranienne, elles n’ont pas réussi à obtenir un nouvel accord ni à modifier les comportements stratégiques de Téhéran. Aujourd’hui, en vue de son deuxième mandat, Trump semble prêt à relancer cette stratégie. Cependant, “Maximum Pressure 2.0” est vouée à l’échec, pour des raisons similaires à celles de son précédent mandat.

La campagne de pression maximale vise à forcer l’Iran à accepter des concessions majeures : le démantèlement de sites nucléaires, des restrictions sur son programme balistique et une réduction de son soutien aux groupes armés régionaux. Cependant, ces demandes ont déjà été catégoriquement rejetées lors de précédentes négociations. Même en brandissant une menace militaire implicite, Trump se heurterait à une réalité stratégique : l’Iran sait que les États-Unis, concentrés sur leur rivalité stratégique avec la Chine, n’ont aucun intérêt à se lancer dans un nouveau conflit militaire au Moyen-Orient. Dans ce contexte, Téhéran pourrait proposer un accord limité, comme une réduction de son stock d’uranium enrichi, tout en refusant de céder sur des points clés. Un tel compromis, bien en deçà du JCPOA, soulignerait les limites de cette stratégie et l’échec de la pression maximale.

Les exportations de pétrole, cruciales pour l’économie iranienne, ont été une cible principale des sanctions américaines. Sous Trump, elles sont passées de plus de 2 millions de barils par jour (b/j) en 2018 à moins de 600 000 b/j en 2019. Cependant, sous l’administration Biden, un relâchement dans l’application des sanctions a permis à l’Iran de remonter à 1,8 million de b/j, principalement grâce à la Chine. Trump et ses alliés envisagent de réimposer des restrictions plus strictes pour asphyxier l’économie iranienne, mais ces efforts risquent d’être contournés par le commerce parallèle et le soutien d’alliés comme la Russie.

Contrairement à 2018, les alliés des États-Unis au Moyen-Orient, tels que l’Arabie saoudite, ne soutiennent plus cette approche de confrontation. Grâce à une médiation chinoise, Riyad a entamé un rapprochement diplomatique avec Téhéran, privilégiant désormais la stabilité régionale à une escalade des tensions. Craignant une reprise des attaques sur ses infrastructures pétrolières, l’Arabie saoudite s’oppose à des actions susceptibles de raviver des hostilités. Par ailleurs, une reprise de la stratégie de pression maximale risquerait de déstabiliser davantage une région déjà fragile, exacerbant les tensions sans fournir de solution durable au problème nucléaire.

Le défi d’un changement de régime

Malgré les sanctions, l’Iran continue de contourner les restrictions avec le soutien de partenaires comme la Corée du Nord et la Russie. En parallèle, le régime des mollahs renforce son influence régionale à travers ses proxys, armant et finançant des groupes au sein du “croissant chiite” en Irak, en Syrie, au Liban et au Yémen. Plus préoccupant encore, l’Iran cherche désormais à étendre son influence jusqu’en Tunisie, où il finance la construction de plusieurs mosquées chiites – une première dans l’histoire moderne de ce pays à majorité sunnite malékite. Le chiisme, longtemps marginal en Tunisie, voit sa présence croître depuis la révolution iranienne de 1979, favorisée par des associations soutenues par le régime iranien. Ces efforts soulignent un agenda expansionniste qui pourrait transformer la Tunisie en un nouveau proxy de l’Iran. Une telle évolution risque de fracturer davantage la société tunisienne, alors que des voix conservatrices dénoncent déjà cette montée d’influence.

L’expérience de 2018-2020 montre que la “pression maximale” renforce les factions les plus dures en Iran, qui exploitent la menace extérieure pour justifier une répression accrue. Malgré une économie affaiblie, Téhéran a non seulement poursuivi son programme nucléaire, mais a également intensifié son soutien aux groupes armés régionaux. En outre, cette politique unilatérale alimente la méfiance des partenaires européens et régionaux des États-Unis, érodant leur soutien et compliquant toute tentative de réponse coordonnée aux défis posés par l’Iran.

La stratégie de “pression maximale” a déjà montré ses limites et échouera à produire des résultats significativement différents cette fois-ci. Elle risque non seulement d’aggraver l’instabilité régionale, mais aussi de nuire à la crédibilité des États-Unis sur la scène internationale. Face à l’agenda agressif du régime iranien, illustré par son influence croissante dans les pays de la région, de la péninsule arabique jusqu’en Afrique du nord, il devient évident que toute tentative de compromis ou de coopération internationale sans s’attaquer directement à l’arsenal nucléaire iranien ne sera qu’un leurre. Les politiques fondées sur des sanctions économiques ou des négociations limitées n’ont jusqu’ici pas réussi à freiner les ambitions stratégiques de Téhéran. Si les États-Unis souhaitent réellement contenir les ambitions régionales de l’Iran et restaurer une forme de stabilité, leur stratégie doit aller au-delà d’une simple pression économique ou militaire et viser un changement de régime à Téhéran.

Une telle politique, combinée à une action résolue contre le programme nucléaire iranien, mettrait les pays du Golfe devant le fait accompli. Bien que ces derniers puissent initialement hésiter, ils finiraient par se rallier aux États-Unis en comprenant que cette fois-ci, l’objectif de Trump serait d’en finir avec le régime des mollahs, ouvrant la voie à une nouvelle ère politique pour l’Iran. Cela pourrait inclure le retour de figures comme le Chah d’Iran Reza Pahlavi, qui symbolise une alternative laïque et pro-occidentale. Une telle démarche, bien qu’ambitieuse, pourrait redéfinir l’équilibre régional en affaiblissant définitivement l’influence iranienne et en offrant une vision claire d’un Moyen-Orient débarrassé de la menace du régime actuel.

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“Echoes from Tunisia: Populism, Transition, and Hopes for Democracy” – Ghazi Ben Ahmed Releases His New Book on Tunisia

Ghazi Ben Ahmed — Fri, 20 Sep 2024 22:21:08 +0000

Echoes from Tunisia, Populism, Transition, and Hopes for Democracy (Ed. L’Harmattan, release date: 23 september 2024). I firmly believe that the (controversial) presidential elections in Tunisia provide an opportunity to assess the state of the country and the record of President Kaïs Saïed, who holds all powers. What are his achievements? What is the added value of this hyper-presidency? With what results is candidate Kaïs Saïed presenting himself to the people?

My book is an opportunity to open this debate, but beyond that, it is much more than just a political essay. It is a committed, rigorous, and nuanced work that offers a deep and objective analysis of Tunisia’s internal dynamics while connecting them to global transformations. It is essential not only for Tunisians seeking to understand the challenges their country faces but also for Europeans wanting to grasp the complex interactions between migration, populism, and international relations.

In summary, this book is an indispensable tool for anyone wishing to understand the crucial issues of today’s world, whether in politics, economics, or geopolitics. Tunisia, at the crossroads between its past, its tumultuous present, and its future aspirations, is revealed in all its complexity through these pages. It is a must-read for anyone who seeks to better understand our times and the challenges that lie ahead.

L’Harmattan also provides us with a summary of the contents of the book by Ghazi Ben Ahmed, founder of Mediterranean Development Initiative, on the back cover: “This book offers a hard-hitting analysis of the political and socio-economic crisis in Tunisia, exploring its genesis and its repercussions on Europe. As populist President Kais Saied consolidates his authoritarian rule, the situation extends far beyond Tunisia’s borders, leading to increased migration to Europe and fuelling populist and far-right rhetoric.

The book also highlights the decisive role of European policies, particularly Italian, in consolidating this authoritarian regime, a particularly crucial issue with the arrival of a new European executive. It also highlights the European Union’s lack of a long-term vision for Tunisia, and the recycling of its existing policies, which often limit the potential of relations between the two shores. By revealing these interconnections, this book invites reflection on the future of Euro-Mediterranean relations and the impact of these policy choices on the stability of Europe and its southern neighbourhood. It hopes to inspire greater understanding and cooperation between Tunisia and the European Union, for the mutual benefit of all concerned.”

The book by our founder Ghazi Ben Ahmed is available for pre-order on the Harmattan website in French ONLY. It will be published on 23 September. The price is 27 euros (+ postage).

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Mediterranean Development Initiative teams up with Middle East Institute Switzerland

Ghazi Ben Ahmed — Fri, 03 May 2024 14:26:09 +0000

We are thrilled to announce our partnership with the think tank MEIS | Middle East Institute Switzerland! Mediterranean Development Initiative joins forces with MEIS | Middle East Institute Switzerland to continue its projects, particularly regarding the southern Mediterranean and the Middle East.

Registered in 2021, MEIS is a global network of experts and practitioners exclusively dedicated to the Middle East and North Africa, providing advisory for businesses, producing policy analysis for governments, and developing innovative policies for the Middle East and North Africa.

In the attached photo, our founder Ghazi Ben Ahmed, is seen signing the partnership with Andrea Cellino, representing MEIS and overseeing North Africa-related affairs.

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Meeting with Ivan Krastev in Oxford

Ghazi Ben Ahmed — Sun, 24 Mar 2024 17:47:04 +0000

The Chairman of MDI, Ghazi Ben Ahmed, met with the President of the Centre for Liberal Strategies in Sofia, Ivan Krastev, in Oxford (UK), to discuss cooperation.

Ivan Krastev is a political scientist, permanent fellow at the IWM (Institute of Human Sciences) in Vienna and Richard von Weizsäcker fellow at the Robert Bosch Stiftung in Berlin.

He is a founding board member of the European Council on Foreign Relations, a member of the board of trustees of the International Crisis Group and is a contributing opinion writer for The New York Times.

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Ghazi Ben Ahmed – Founder, President and BAC-NA Plateform coordinator

Ghazi Ben Ahmed — Tue, 28 Mar 2023 23:23:32 +0000

The crisis that began with the Arab unrest resulted in a near universal failure to implement the long-term structural reforms required to transform rent-seeking and state-dominated economies into modern ones that embrace both digital and ecological transformation and recognize the salutary impact of competition and private enterprise. There has been much talk about structural reforms but rather limited cohesive commitment to action, as the need to confront short-term problems over long-term problems prevailed.

Today, there is an urgent need for the Mediterranean Region to strengthen its resilience to shocks and accelerate its economic recovery while making growth more inclusive. Policy priorities include accelerating structural reforms to ensure macroeconomic stability, improve governance and business environment, boost competitiveness to attract private investment.

We strongly believe that the EuroMed countries needs a new blueprint to build resilience and bring hope and prosperity to the Region. The COVID19 pandemic represents a rare but narrow window of opportunity to reflect, reimagine, and reset the EuroMed agreements and for countries in the region to rethink supply chain and strengthen trade and regional integration in order to balance efficiency with resilience. Trade and integration within the EuroMed region and with Africa can provide an opportunity to enhance regional trade relations by establishing safe, green and resilient regional supply chains of essential, and non-essential goods and services in the post-COVID era, and unleash forces for Mediterranean dynamism and position the Med/Africa region as a global player.

Our role as a Euro Mediterranean think tank is to prepare the ground for Southern Mediterranean Neighbors (SMNs) to resume (or start) negotiations with the EU, aiming at “building the Region they want to live in: A Euro Mediterranean Union of vitality in a world of fragility”. A shrewd agreement encompassing a new contract/project and focusing on hubs in sub-regions and variable geometry, could promote economic modernization and growth, to strengthen and stabilize the region. We are putting special emphasis on culture across the Mediterranean region as a tool for a vibrant Mediterranean civil society that can aspire and give a strong impetus for change.

The linchpin of a renewed Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is a long-term vision which is absolutely necessary to make the notion of partnership credible, to give the necessary incentives to SMNs to carry out a consistent set of reforms and ensure that these reforms are underpinned by the strong approbation of the broader citizenry, especially the youth, and to ease political resistance in order to secure the cooperation of SDNs on border control and management, readmission of their nationals who are irregularly present in the EU, and on reception of third country nationals (TCNs) who transited to Europe through their territories.

We are living a Euro-Mediterranean moment. Faced with an extremely challenging near-term outlook shaped by sharply higher food, fertilizer, and energy prices, rising interest rates and credit spreads, currency depreciation, and climate crisis, the best response is Euro-Mediterranean. This severe outlook has hit the Region at a time when many countries are already struggling with governance and rule of law, debt sustainability, climate adaptation and mitigation, and limited fiscal budgets to counteract the critical reversals in development from the COVID-19 pandemic.

The role of the MDI will finally be a moment of projection. The urgency of the moment but also the sense of the future have sharpened the need for the EuroMed Region to lead the twin green and digital transitions and revigorated the EuroMed partnerships for more prosperity and resilience. This creates an unparalleled opportunity to move out of the fragility of the crisis by creating a new vitality for a sustainable EuroMed Region.

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