The price visible on trading screens reflects transactions already executed; it does not fully incorporate routes disrupted, insurance premiums recalculated, and supply chains placed under geopolitical constraint. Markets continue to treat oil primarily as a commodity. Yet in the Strait of Hormuz, it is increasingly subject to geopolitical leverage.

For Tunisia, this shift is not theoretical. It has direct macroeconomic consequences.

A Budget Assumption Under Strain

Tunisia’s 2026 Finance Law is built on an assumed average oil price of $63.3 per barrel. Current levels stand well above that reference. The deviation is economically significant.

Each additional dollar in the price of oil adds approximately 164 million dinars to compensation expenditures. This mechanism is automatic: higher import costs expand subsidy requirements, widening the fiscal deficit unless offset by higher revenues or expenditure restraint.

At $80 per barrel, fiscal pressure intensifies. At $90, adjustment becomes considerably more difficult. At $100, the budgetary impact is substantial and sustained.

Tunisia enters this phase with elevated public debt, rigid expenditure structures dominated by wages, subsidies, and debt servicing, and limited access to international capital markets. In such a configuration, the scope for discretionary counter-cyclical policy is structurally constrained.

Inflation Through Production and Imports

The oil shock extends beyond public finances. Energy is a core input in transport, electricity generation, agriculture, and manufacturing. Petroleum derivatives are embedded in plastics, packaging, fertilizers, and numerous industrial processes. Tunisia also imports finished goods from economies where energy prices are not subsidized, meaning higher oil prices are transmitted directly through import costs.

The consequence is imported inflation.

According to Capital Economics, a prolonged conflict pushing oil to $100 per barrel could add between 0.6 and 0.7 percentage points to global inflation. For Tunisia, such an increase would translate into higher consumer prices, further compressing purchasing power at a time when households are already adjusting to elevated living costs.

Inflation in this context is not merely a statistical outcome; it has distributive effects, disproportionately affecting lower- and middle-income households whose consumption baskets are more sensitive to energy and transport costs.

External Balances and Logistical Pressures

As a net importer of hydrocarbons, Tunisia’s trade balance is structurally sensitive to oil prices. A sustained rise in the energy bill deepens the current account deficit and places additional strain on foreign-exchange reserves; a key buffer for exchange-rate stability and external confidence.

Logistics compound this vulnerability. Maritime insurance premiums have increased amid instability affecting transit routes, particularly through the Suez Canal. Rerouting and security surcharges raise freight costs, affecting both consumer goods and intermediate inputs used in domestic production.

Meanwhile, JPMorgan Chase has noted that dozens of empty oil tankers are currently waiting near the Gulf region. Storage capacity in producing countries is limited to only a few days of output. Should disruptions persist, logistical bottlenecks could evolve into production constraints, reinforcing upward pressure on prices and prolonging market tightness.

Under such conditions, what begins as volatility risks becoming structural imbalance.

A Dual Shock in a Constrained Policy Environment

The present oil surge constitutes a dual shock for Tunisia:

• Fiscal, through rising compensation costs and widening deficits;
• Economic, through imported inflation, higher production expenses, and increased transport costs.

These channels interact. Larger subsidies expand borrowing needs; higher import bills weaken external balances; inflation erodes real incomes; slower growth limits revenue mobilization. The cumulative effect narrows policy options further.

Tunisia’s vulnerability is structural. The economy remains heavily dependent on imported hydrocarbons to sustain transport, electricity generation, and industry. Export diversification remains limited, and foreign-currency earnings are insufficient to offset large energy import bills. Fiscal rigidities reduce flexibility precisely when flexibility is most needed.

Without structural reform – including accelerated investment in renewable energy, improved energy efficiency, enhanced export competitiveness, and a credible medium-term fiscal consolidation strategy – exposure to external energy shocks will persist.

Regional Context, Asymmetric Exposure

Tunisia is not alone in its sensitivity to oil prices. Morocco, also a net oil importer, faces similar exposure to prolonged price increases and imported inflation.

By contrast, Algeria, as a hydrocarbon exporter, benefits from higher prices in the short term. Yet its fiscal and external balances remain closely tied to energy revenues, and regional instability carries its own financial and security risks. Energy shocks reshape North African macroeconomic dynamics, albeit asymmetrically.

A Narrow Margin for Absorption

The Strait of Hormuz lies far from Tunis geographically, but its stability influences Tunisia’s fiscal trajectory, inflation path, reserve adequacy, and growth outlook. In an interconnected energy system, distance offers no insulation.

If oil prices stabilize quickly, Tunisia will face a demanding but manageable adjustment. If elevated prices persist, the convergence of fiscal expansion, external deterioration, and inflationary pressure could significantly constrain macroeconomic stability.

In this context, the gravest risk is not simply fiscal slippage or higher inflation, but a broader breakdown of economic stability;  one that could weaken the dinar, exhaust foreign-exchange reserves, and trigger acute shortages. Such a configuration would not remain confined to macroeconomic indicators; it would carry profound social and political consequences in a country where economic strain has historically translated into systemic upheaval.

A further vulnerability lies in Tunisia’s increasingly constrained diplomatic positioning. External financial support cannot be assumed. In previous crises, Gulf countries provided liquidity backstops or budgetary assistance. Today, geopolitical alignments are more fragmented, and Tunisia’s ambiguous positioning in regional tensions may reduce the likelihood of rapid financial relief from traditional partners.

Should regional polarization intensify, economic repercussions could extend beyond capital flows. Labor mobility, remittance channels, and bilateral economic ties may become exposed to political recalibration. For countries such as Tunisia and Algeria, whose citizens maintain economic linkages across the Gulf, the risk is not only financial but also socio-economic.

In such a scenario and to conclude, the convergence of constrained external financing, accelerating dinar depreciation, reserve exhaustion, entrenched inflation, and disrupted remittance inflows would not merely intensify macroeconomic stress; it could transform what is currently treated as speculative risk into the premature unraveling of an already fragile economic system. An economy structurally dependent on external financing, weak in productive diversification, and unable to generate sustained growth or macroeconomic stability cannot indefinitely absorb cumulative shocks.

Under prolonged pressure, the outcome would not be a cyclical adjustment, but the materialization of a risk long feared yet seldom articulated: that sustained economic breakdown could once again trigger systemic political rupture. If left unaddressed, the consequences may extend beyond institutional instability to social fragmentation and lasting damage to the state itself. The question is no longer whether reform is necessary, but whether there is still time to act.

Ghazi Ben Ahmed

Founder of MDI

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L’article An Oil Shock Tunisia Cannot Absorb Without Structural Reforms est apparu en premier sur mdi-international.

Ghazi Ben Ahmed

Founder and President

Ghazi Ben Ahmed

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A small river named Duden flows by their place and supplies it with the necessary

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L’article Tunisia: a possible US – facilitated recovery? est apparu en premier sur mdi-international.

In 2022, 1,816,833 Tunisians—representing 15.4% of the population—were registered as TRE (Tunisians Residing Abroad), which amounts to roughly one out of every seven citizens.

The conclusion is clear: Tunisian migration has intensified over the past decade, especially among young people. A genuine brain drain is underway, and engineering and medicine—sectors in high demand worldwide—are the most affected by this outward migration.

According to an official statement by the Dean of Tunisian Engineers, Kamel Sahnoun, in 2025, 39,000 engineers out of 90,000 registered with the Order of Engineers have left Tunisia to settle abroad. The country trains approximately 8,000 engineers each year, and on average, 20 engineers emigrate every day, further worsening the shortage of qualified labor in several key sectors.

Even more alarming, in 2025, out of a graduating class of 1,900 Tunisian doctors, 1,600 left Tunisia to work abroad.

The Tunisian brain drain reveals a deep imbalance between the country’s human potential and its national ability to retain and utilize it.

Tunisia invests substantially in training its engineers, doctors, and researchers, but the benefits of this investment materialize abroad, in countries that are better equipped to absorb and value this talent.

According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM – UN Migration), the majority of young Tunisians who emigrate cite as their main motivations: lack of professional opportunities, low salaries, and limited career prospects.

For example, Tunisia is now the leading provider of foreign doctors in France, after Morocco. And without significant economic and social improvements, these numbers are likely to rise in the future.

Ahmed Lagha

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Ahmed Lagha

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L’article A nation drained: The alarming rise of Tunisian migration among youth est apparu en premier sur mdi-international.

With Donald Trump’s return to the White House, Arab powers are racing to secure Washington’s favor. From Riyadh to Abu Dhabi, regional giants are pledging massive U.S. investments—$600 billion from Saudi Arabia, $1.4 trillion over a decade from the UAE—targeting AI, semiconductors, and energy. Amid this geopolitical bidding war, Algeria—long known for its cautious, non-aligned foreign policy—has made a series of unexpected moves

With Donald Trump’s return to the White House, Arab powers are racing to secure Washington’s favor. From Riyadh to Abu Dhabi, regional giants are pledging massive U.S. investments—$600 billion from Saudi Arabia, $1.4 trillion over a decade from the UAE—targeting AI, semiconductors, and energy. Amid this geopolitical bidding war, Algeria—long known for its cautious, non-aligned foreign policy—has made a series of unexpected moves.

After years of resisting deeper ties with the U.S., Algiers abruptly signed a military agreement with AFRICOM and followed it with an energy deal with ExxonMobil. These rapid overtures seem less a strategic pivot than a sign of regime anxiety—an attempt to stay relevant in a new order defined by transactional diplomacy. But unlike the Gulf monarchies, Algeria lacks financial clout or strategic leverage. It remains a regional giant with feet of clay: economically fragile, diplomatically isolated, and increasingly adrift.

At the heart of Algeria’s outreach lies one goal: recalibrating U.S. policy on Western Sahara. Since Morocco normalized ties with Israel, Washington—particularly under the Trump administration—has backed Rabat’s claim over the disputed territory, marginalizing Algeria’s historic support for Sahrawi self-determination. That support was recently reaffirmed on April 8^th, 2025, when U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio visited Rabat and publicly reiterated America’s recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over the Sahara, marking a further blow to Algeria’s diplomatic posture. While Algiers continues to block the UN-led political process and refuses to engage as a responsible stakeholder, the narrative in Washington is hardening. U.S. Congressman Joe Wilson recently announced, “I will introduce legislation to designate the Polisario as terrorists. Iran & Putin gaining a foothold in Africa via Polisario. Connect the dots: axis of aggression.” This stark framing no longer views the Polisario as a liberation movement, but as a proxy within a broader authoritarian alliance. Algeria is no longer just isolated — it’s exposed. Behind the talk of sovereignty lies a regime openly backing Iran, Russia, and a separatist militia now described in Washington as part of an “axis of aggression.” The mask has fallen.

Officially, Algeria upholds non-interference and peaceful resolution. In practice, it has long aligned with authoritarian regimes—most notably Iran and the now-fallen Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad. These ties, rooted in anti-Western solidarity and opposition to Gulf influence, have left Algeria increasingly out of step with shifting Arab consensus. Algiers remained one of Assad’s last defenders, facilitating Polisario presence in Syria.

Officially, Algeria upholds non-interference and peaceful resolution. In practice, it has long aligned itself with authoritarian regimes—most notably Iran and the now-fallen Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad. These ties, rooted in anti-Western solidarity and opposition to Gulf influence, have left Algeria increasingly out of sync with the evolving Arab consensus. Algiers remained one of Assad’s last defenders, facilitating Polisario presence in Syria even as other Arab states distanced themselves. Over the years, Iran has cultivated a wide web of proxies to advance its regional influence. According to The Washington Post, this includes training fighters from the Algeria-backed Polisario Front—nominally focused on Western Sahara, but increasingly embedded in Tehran’s broader militant network. Today, hundreds of these fighters have been detained by Syria’s post-Assad security forces, underscoring just how entangled the Polisario had become in Iran’s shadow wars. This exposure not only further discredits Algeria’s narrative of neutrality, but also reveals the dangerous externalization of a conflict it claims to keep within diplomatic bounds.

Furthermore, maintaining ties with Iran and its alignment with groups like Hamas—while consistent with Algeria’s historical support for Palestine—risks deepening its rift with key Western and Arab partners at a time when strategic neutrality is increasingly difficult to sustain.

With Assad gone and Iran under maximum pressure, Algeria’s authoritarian alliances are crumbling—exposing its strategic vulnerability. Behind its non-interference rhetoric lies a regime that instinctively sides with autocrats, driven by fear of democratic contagion. Since the Arab Spring, Algiers has resisted reform, backing repression over change. Now, as old alliances crumble, it stands increasingly alone—trapped by a model it cannot abandon without threatening the very foundations of its regime.

Meanwhile, regional pressures on Algeria are intensifying. The Sahel is unraveling under successive coups and Russian mercenary influence, Libya remains unstable, and ties with Morocco are frozen over Western Sahara and normalization with Israel. Algeria’s quiet support for Tunisia’s president Kaïs Saïed only adds to its exposure. Once a buffer, Tunisia is now a source of instability—politically repressive, economically paralyzed, and diplomatically shunned.

A collapse could send shockwaves across the border, triggering economic contagion, insecurity, and unrest in Algeria itself, where stagnation, high unemployment, and a disillusioned youth are already testing the regime’s limits.

These mounting pressures are unfolding against a backdrop of economic fragility. Energy remains the backbone of Algeria’s economy—accounting for 98% of exports—but it no longer ensures strategic relevance. As global markets accelerate toward renewables, Algeria failed to seize critical opportunities—particularly during Europe’s pivot away from Russian gas. Years of under-investment, corruption, and mismanagement have stifled production and innovation. Rather than driving transformation, hydrocarbon revenues are increasingly used as a political safety valve—buying social peace in moments of tension, but reinforcing the rentier status quo instead of reforming it.

What Algeria faces today is not a policy crossroads—it is a regime dilemma. Reforming the economy would require dismantling the opaque patronage networks that control the distribution of oil and gas rents. These networks have long shielded the regime from accountability, entrenched elite control, and stifled entrepreneurship. Reform would mean loosening the system’s grip on power. Refusal would accelerate decline.

Algeria is no longer just drifting — it is decaying in plain sight. A regime built on oil rents and military rule is now out of time, out of ideas, and out of allies. It clings to outdated alliances, obstructs diplomatic progress, and resists every pressure to reform — not out of strategy, but out of fear. Fear of accountability. Fear of its own people. But this equilibrium of repression and denial is brittle — and it may not hold much longer. The spark could come any time from within, or it could arrive from across the border. Tunisia’s deepening unrest — political paralysis, social explosion, economic collapse — is unfolding next door, and its aftershocks will not stop at the frontier. The anger swelling in Tunis today mirrors the frustration simmering in Algiers. And when pressure builds in parallel, collapse often comes in waves. Algerians have endured too much for too long. They deserve more than a system built to preserve power — not serve the people.

This article was written by our founder Ghazi Ben Ahmed on the media The Geopolitics.The Geopolitics (TGP) is a uniquely global source of news, analysis and commentary on current geopolitical issues, politics and international relations.

Ghazi Ben Ahmed

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Ghazi Ben Ahmed

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L’article Trapped by Its Own Model: Algeria at the Edge est apparu en premier sur mdi-international.

The border externalisation strategy promoted by Italy’s Georgia Meloni government represents a political and legal failure, highlighting the contradictions of a hardline rhetoric against irregular immigration. Since coming to power, the government has promised an uncompromising defense of Italy’s borders.

However, this ambition has translated into an attempt to shift the management of migration outside national borders through agreements such as the one signed with Albania. Presented as an innovative solution, this strategy faces significant legal and practical limitations, raising serious questions about its compliance with European and international law while proving ineffective and counterproductive.

The Italy-Albania protocol, signed on 6 November 2023, commits Albania to providing land free of charge for five years, where Italy has built, at its own expense, facilities for the detention of migrants.

These facilities include hotspots for rapid processing and repatriation centers for deportation.

Migrants detained in these centres would be subject to procedures under Italian law: if their asylum requests were approved, they would be transferred to Italy; if denied, they would be deported.

However, if deportation was not possible within 18 months, the migrants would still be returned to Italy.

The protocol explicitly excludes the possibility of migrants remaining in Albania, creating an evident contradiction: either migrants violate the agreement by attempting to escape, or the centre would have the same effect as a facility located in Italy, but with significantly higher costs.

Beyond these operational shortcomings, the protocol raises serious legal issues and lacks adequate guarantees for migrants.

The absence of clear provisions for transportation and compliance with European legal procedures conflicts with standards established by the European Court of Human Rights, as in the Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy case, which prohibits migration procedures without proper legal safeguards.

Furthermore, independent reports have documented discriminatory treatment of asylum seekers in Albania, compounded by often inhumane conditions in detention centres.

This approach, beyond violating fundamental rights, subjects individuals to the trauma of detention, even if they ultimately end up being admitted to Italy.

ECJ ruling throws spanner in the works

The recent ruling by the European Court of Justice has further complicated the Italian government’s position. The court determined that a country can only be considered “safe” if safety is guaranteed uniformly across its entire territory.

This interpretation led the Rome Tribunal to invalidate the detention in Albania of 12 asylum seekers from countries like Bangladesh and Egypt, which do not meet the criteria for being deemed safe.

Judges ordered the transfer of these migrants to Italy, confirming that border externalisation cannot be used as a pretext to circumvent obligations under European law.

While Italy’s externalisation strategy faces mounting challenges, it is worrying to see other European countries showing interest in adopting similar approaches.

The UK, under Labour prime minister Keir Starmer, has expressed keen interest in learning from Meloni’s policies.

During a recent visit to Rome, Starmer praised Italy’s “remarkable progress” in curbing migration flows and combating smuggling networks.

Following a tragic shipwreck in the English Channel, which claimed the lives of eight migrants, Starmer expressed a desire to replicate agreements like those between Italy and Albania to manage migration more effectively.

This marks a significant departure from his previous criticisms of the Conservative government’s controversial Rwanda deportation plan, which he had dismissed as a “costly gimmick.”

While the Rwanda plan was ultimately ruled illegal by British courts, Starmer’s interest in externalisation agreements raises questions about the direction of UK migration policy and its potential alignment with Italy’s contentious model.

This policy also fails to address long-term implications.

The agreement with Albania is limited to five years. What will happen afterward?

Additionally, if EU candidate countries like Albania are pressured to manage part of Europe’s asylum procedures, it becomes difficult to imagine how they could resist increasing demands from the EU, given their reliance on European support for accession processes.

The idea of outsourcing asylum procedures beyond EU borders not only represents a false solution but also risks setting a precedent that other countries — or even the EU itself — could adopt, with high costs and no tangible impact on the structural issues of migration.

The construction of the Gjadër centre cost €60m, and its maintenance generates significant expenses, including for police, prison staff, medical personnel, and other officials.

Even while inactive, the centre continues to incur high operational costs to prevent its deterioration, while the operation of the transfer ship costs approximately €15,000 per day. This expensive policy is not only unsustainable but also proves ineffective in achieving its stated objectives.

Thus, the strategy of border externalisation benefits neither asylum seekers nor the implementing countries nor the transit countries, while severely undermining the fundamental principles of European law.

When will governments finally focus on real solutions, such as equitable distribution among member states and expedited, efficient procedures? Only through respect for human rights and legal norms can the challenges of migration be addressed with seriousness and responsibility.

This article was co-authored by Laila Sahnoune and Ghazi Ben Ahmed, researchers at Mediterranean Development Initiative, a Euro-Mediterranean think tank dedicated to analysing and promoting strategic solutions for sustainable development, regional cooperation and public policy in the Euro-Mediterranean region. The article was published on euobserver.com, an online non-profit news outlet reporting on the European Union.

L’article The legal and moral failings of Meloni’s Albania deportation deal est apparu en premier sur mdi-international.

However, these words are out of step with reality. While the president portrayed himself as a defender of a self-sufficient Tunisia, his ministers were busy seeking loans from foreign banks and countries to secure vital funds for an economy on the brink of collapse.

These loans, although necessary, have led to drastic economic reforms that have resulted in significant food shortages and fueled popular discontent. The first measure was the removal of subsidies on basic food products, a decision that caused shortages, particularly of durum wheat, soft wheat, and vegetable oils, and led to a 64% drop in the trade balance in November 2023. These subsidies, established during Bourguiba’s era, were abruptly ended without proper preparation, exacerbating the situation.

Even though Tunisia no longer relies on the IMF, it has taken out loans from countries across three continents. In this way, it borrowed €810.5 million from Europe and received $1.62 billion from international, African, Arab, and Asian financial institutions over the past two years.

On July 2, 2024, Finance Minister Sihem Namsia announced that Tunisia had repaid all its domestic and foreign debt services for 2023, an amount of approximately $2.7 billion, which the government presented as a success. But this “success” was achieved at the cost of massive borrowing, further worsening the country’s economic and social situation.

Tunisians, facing shortages of basic necessities, endure scenes of endless queues to obtain rice, sugar, or flour. These shortages and the general impoverishment have fueled growing anger.

And now? Inflation remains unchecked, the dinar continues to depreciate against the euro, and economic growth is almost non-existent. Faced with these challenges, it is imperative to find solutions before future generations are left to pay the price for today’s mistakes, often exploited for electoral purposes.

This article was strongly inspired by the story published by the Tunisian media outlet Nawaat on 22 August 2024.

Ahmed Lagha

Cofounder and Treasurer

Ahmed Lagha

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L’article The Repayment of Tunisia’s Debt: A Never-Ending Trap? est apparu en premier sur mdi-international.

In his speech on April 25th about the European project, French President Emmanuel Macron called for a strategic leap to prevent the decline of Europe. According to Ghazi Ben Ahmed, this leap also requires the implementation of a policy that both controls entries into the EU and opens legal pathways for migration.

Aging population, declining workforce … Because pressing demographic challenges threaten its economic competitiveness and the sustainability of its social protection systems, Europe can no longer afford to ignore the economic and social implications of immigration, especially if it aims to move towards a wartime economy and strategic autonomy.

Neither Laxity Nor Populism

The new European executive, particularly within the Schengen area, must lead the establishment of innovative cooperations and develop policies based on a renewed narrative, without yielding to either laxity or authoritarian populism. The currently proposed models have proven ineffective, as evidenced by the memorandums of understanding that the European Union has signed with Tunisia and Egypt to externalize migration management. These agreements only serve to strengthen authoritarian regimes, disregarding the fate of migrants and the inhumane treatment they often endure.

Similarly, subcontracting agreements like those concluded by the United Kingdom or Italy, which envisage transferring migrants to third countries, often far from their countries of origin, must be reevaluated. These practices, far from solving problems, simply shift responsibilities and exacerbate the ethical issues related to migration. This was highlighted by Emmanuel Macron in his recent speech at the Sorbonne, where he condemned such actions as a “geopolitics of cynicism that betrays our values, builds new dependencies, and will prove totally ineffective.”

A balanced European solution does not involve retreating inward but effectively protecting borders against a massive influx of irregular migrants while scrupulously respecting human rights and promoting legal and chosen migration. It is crucial to implement policies that not only control entries but also simultaneously open legal pathways for migration.

Prioritizing Short-Term Mobility

To open these legal pathways, we could design visas for short-term migration or mobility based on temporary contracts, renewable for five years, allowing migrants to work in Europe for six to nine months per year before returning to their home country and ensuring they can come back the following year. These measures would have the advantage of meeting labor needs in key sectors while allowing migrants to maintain strong ties with their home countries, thus promoting economic development through acquired skills and remittances. Furthermore, such an approach would enhance social cohesion in Europe by reducing tensions and combating negative stereotypes associated with immigration. This implies that African partners also have their share of responsibility and obligations so that everyone benefits.

The challenge, therefore, lies in finding a balance between the demands of the EU and those of its southern neighbors. The new European executive and member states must address both illegal and legal migration. This means, on one hand, humanely treating illegal migrants that southern countries will commit to taking back and, on the other hand, offering southern countries some form of compensation for each legal migrant who comes to live and work in the EU. It is imperative that the EU stops viewing Africa merely as a talent pool to exploit without reciprocation and recognizes the need for close collaboration with this continent to build its strategic autonomy and transform it into a power. Additionally, without active support and renewal, this talent reservoir risks drying up.

Combining Security, Humanity, and Economy

Emmanuel Macron’s call for a “powerful Europe” appears to be a “good impetus”—according to German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who reacted to Macron’s speech in a tweet—and a rallying cry for a Union aspiring to combine security, humanity, and long-term economic vision. Coincidentally, at the same time, Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski, speaking before the Sejm, the lower house of Parliament, outlined his vision of Poland’s role in the European project in almost identical terms: “The EU has become a geopolitical project. Poland’s role is to support this process.”

Thus, within the Weimar Triangle, a cooperation platform bringing together Poland, France, and Germany, a shared political vision is emerging to strengthen Europe. This strategic vision for a “powerful Europe” calls for a renewal of EU migration policies, which should no longer be merely reactive and security-focused but also proactive, integrated into a comprehensive approach to sustainable development and North-South cooperation. This vital project for Europe will require not only bold proposals—like those put forward by Emmanuel Macron—but also an increased capacity to overcome internal divisions and rethink leadership dynamics within the European Union. In this context, a certainty emerges that the outgoing President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, discredited and seen as an obstacle to this vision, is probably no longer the right leader to carry this ambitious project forward.

Article written by Ghazi Ben Ahmed and translated from French by Jeune Afrique, on 21 May 2024

Ghazi Ben Ahmed

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Ghazi Ben Ahmed

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L’article For a fair exchange between an aging Europe and a dynamic Africa est apparu en premier sur mdi-international.

Technology at the Service of History and Archaeology. To revolutionize the tourist experience through AI and virtual reality, Tunisian entrepreneur Houda Bakir brings archaeological sites back to life with her startup Historiar. Picture yourself strolling through the ruins of Carthage, immersed in the ambiance of the ancient Phoenician city through immersive technology.

That’s what Historiar offers, a pioneering company in the use of artificial intelligence (AI) and virtual reality to reconstruct historical sites.

Driven by a passion for new technologies and innovation, Houda embarked on her entrepreneurial journey by leveraging her expertise in AI and VR to create unique immersive experiences. Her company, Historiar, has developed automated solutions to recreate archaeological sites in Tunisia, offering visitors an educational and entertaining experience.

But Historiar‘s impact extends beyond the tourist sphere. By using AI to accelerate the process of site reconstruction, Houda demonstrates the potential of this technology to revolutionize the archaeology sector and preserve our cultural heritage in innovative ways.

Through partnerships with sites in Europe and Orange Fab’s acceleration program, Historiar is poised to expand its influence internationally, offering a global audience the opportunity to discover history in an interactive and immersive way.

For Houda, AI is not just a tool; it’s an opportunity to rethink how we interact with the past, stimulate curiosity, and inspire enthusiasm for history and culture. Her work perfectly illustrates how technology can serve humanity by enriching our experiences while preserving our heritage for future generations.

At Mediterranean Development Initiative, we support visionaries like Houda Bakir who push the boundaries of innovation to create a world where the past and present meet through harmonious fusion.

Ahmed Lagha

Cofounder and Treasurer

Ahmed Lagha

Cofounder and Treasurer

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L’article Reviving History: the tech-driven innovations of Historiar est apparu en premier sur mdi-international.

Tunisia will launch its first public institute specialized in Artificial Intelligence (AI) starting from the next academic year, at the University of Tunis. This public initiative follows the steps taken in the private sector, such as the opening in 2022 of the Pristini School of AI, the first private educational institution specialized in artificial intelligence in Tunisia.

According to recent statements by Professor Mohamed Jaoua, dean of the Pristini School of AI; “I believe that AI will permeate all of society and will not only be used by experts, which is why we need to find an appropriate pedagogy to teach AI to everyone.”

He also confirms that the necessity of having experts capable of overcoming these ethical and societal challenges will allow us to benefit from global innovation through various partnerships to act locally to overcome these challenges.

To go further, Sami Hammami, former vice-president of the University of Sfax, states that there are engineering schools that provide training in artificial intelligence in different disciplines, but without specializing in the field. Computer scientists and mechanical and electrical engineering specialists, for example, use artificial intelligence as a tool for multiple purposes.

The idea of creating a public institution dedicated to the training of specialized AI graduates is entirely original and relevant, “and would help fill the gap currently observed in the university system in Tunisia,” according to him.

Furthermore, the Artificial Intelligence Readiness Index of 2023 ranked Tunisia 81st out of 193 indexed countries, and the ambition is to elevate Tunisia higher in the ranking, matching the private initiatives of our colleagues spread across the globe.

Let’s not forget those who are making Tunisia a global beacon of AI: from the successful unicorn that is InstaDeep by Karim Beguir and Zohra Slim, to Enova ROBOTICS by Anis Sahbani, Optimetriks, Predictive Layer, Evoca Group, and Neurologs!

The creation of this institute opens the door to a regional role in AI education, offering opportunities for collaboration and research beyond national borders and who knows, may make Tunisia the future hub of AI in Africa and the MENA region?

Ahmed Lagha

Cofounder and Treasurer

Ahmed Lagha

Cofounder and Treasurer

A small river named Duden flows by their place and supplies it with the necessary

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L’article Tunisia takes stride towards AI leadership with launch of public institute est apparu en premier sur mdi-international.

It brought together a diverse group of participants, including representatives from our organisation, MEP Salima Yenbou and her team, guests from the European Commission, young Brussels politicians and former diplomats.

Salima Yenbou, MEP, stressed the importance of rethinking EU-Tunisia cooperation, with particular emphasis on the entrepreneurial sector. She called for trade and worker mobility to be facilitated. She stressed the need to work on the problems encountered by entrepreneurs and to seek innovative solutions.

Ghazi Ben Ahmed, President of the MDI, outlined the objective of reconciling the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean in order to achieve the objectives of the 1995 Barcelona Convention. He highlighted the need for economic reforms to generate growth and jobs, stating that these reforms cannot be generated by the Tunisian state alone. He called for collaboration between the private sector and the EU.

Faten Kallel, former Tunisian Secretary of State and founder of KLL Advisory, explained the genesis of the entrepreneurial ecosystem in Tunisia, noting that in 2016-2017 there were frustrations among young entrepreneurs and many departures to countries offering more favourable conditions for entrepreneurship. She mentioned the creation of start-up laws through a participatory approach, which has led to the creation of more than 1,000 start-ups in Tunisia.

Maya Boureghda, lawyer at the Tunis and Paris bars and specializing in banking, finance and corporate law, emphasized the need for dialogue between the public and private sectors as part of the creation of a law on the knowledge economy, in addition to the law on start-ups. She stressed the need not to focus solely on a small percentage of companies.

Mohamed Gastli, CEO of the Franco-Tunisian company NextPROTEIN, shared the shared his experience of setting up his company between the two shores: based in France with production in Tunisia. He highlighted the challenges of financing, R&D and the need to reassure investors about the business environment in Tunisia. As a result, nextProtein has become the only African company exporting proteins from insects to Europe.

Khaled Ben Jilani pleaded for a win-win relationship between Africa, Tunisia and Europe, highlighting the crucial role of African youth and the opportunities for collaboration in various sectors.

Conclusion

The round table highlighted the importance of deeper cooperation between the EU and Tunisia. Participants highlighted the need to create flexible tools to encourage entrepreneurship and growth in Tunisia. They also raised obstacles such as visas, financing, unfair competition and the need for cooperation in financing circular research.

The whole discussion reinforced the idea that the future is bright for Tunisia, with exciting opportunities for growth and innovation. African youth and entrepreneurs are ready to rise to the challenges to build a prosperous future.

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